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Irma: People always ring the doorbell when I cannot
hear it because I am wearing stereo headphones.
Maude: You must be able to hear it; otherwise you could
not tell anyone was ringing it.
Maude's response shows that she had assumed that
(A) the doorbell does not ring when Irma is wearing head-
phones
(B) Irma's visitors never ring the doorbell unless she is wear-
ing headphones
(C) Irma cannot tell that the doorbell has rung unless she has
heard it
(D) the doorbell is not functioning properly'
What kind of perversity makes us ask prospective law students
such questions? Can their answers really tell us anything about
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1. Educational Testing Service (ETS), Law School Admission Test (LSAT), Form
3ALSI, at 1 (1980).
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their potential for the study and practice of law? Is it fair to run
blacks, Hispanics, or other minority students through such a maze
of dialectic? These are among the more important issues raised
and treated, with varying success, in three recent studies: The Reign
of ETS,2 a Nader-sponsored expose of the Educational Testing
Service (Nader Report); An Investigation into the Validity and Cultural
Bias of the Law School Admission Test,3 a National Conference of
Black Lawyers probe into the Law School Admission Test (NCBL
Report); and Law School Admissions Study, 4 a Mexican American Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund report on law school admissions
policies (MALDEF Report).
To those old hands in legal education who were present at the
inauguration of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) in 1948,
the disquiet reflected in these books must surely inspire a sense of
deja vu. In truth, the issues are hardly new, and none of the three
works, in all of their 845 combined pages, provides much in the
way of original data or improved methods for resolving these is-
sues. Yet the concerns that motivate these and other criticisms of
standardized testing are enduring,5 and this most recent wave of
criticism comes when Congress, as well as state legislatures, are
contemplating proposals to reform standardized testing.6 Moreo-
ver, determining whether a test is biased is a problem not unique to
the LSAT. Constitutional or statutory actions that allege discrimi-
nation on the part of employers who use quantitatively scored tests
are commonplace, 7 and a careful inquiry into whether the LSAT is
objectionable can provide insights into the proper use of statistical
analysis in such litigation. 8 In this review, therefore, I shall try to
assess, in a more or less objective fashion,9 some of the charges
2. A. NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS, THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS: THE RALPH
NADER REPORT ON THE EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE (1980) [hereinafter cited without
cross-reference as NADER REPORT].
3. D. White, National Conference of Black Lawyers, An Investigation into the Validity
and Cultural Bias of the Law School Admission Test, Final Report Prepared for the Na-
tional Institute of Education (draft Mar. 31, 1980) [hereinafter cited without cross-
reference as NCBL Report].
4. S. BROWN & E. MARENCO, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS STUDY (1980) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as MALDEF REPORT].
5. There is an extensive critical literature on psychological testing that goes back half a
century. See, e.g., B. HOFFMAN, THE TYRANNY OF TESTING (1962); P. VERNON, INTELLI-
GENCE: HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 18-38 (1979).
6. See R. BROWN, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH ABOUT "TRUTH IN TESTING" LEGISLATION
15-26 (1980).
7. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 65-131 (1976).
8. See p. 453 infra.
9. Some disclaimers, perhaps, are in order. First, I am a white, middle-class law profes-
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Testing
against standardized testing that bear on law school admissions. I
shall first say a few words about the quality of argument in each of
the books and then proceed to the major issues of test bias and va-
lidity.
I. The Critics
It is tempting to dismiss Allan Nairn's report on ETS, "The Cor-
poration that makes up minds," as haute yellow journalism.' 0 Nev-
ertheless, the book has been taken seriously in publications ranging
from Reader's Digest" to Fortune'2 to Science,'3 and much of what it
says is true enough. The products of corporations like ETS and
American College Testing (ACT) do have tremendous impact on
the lives and careers of many Americans.1 4 So-called "intelligence"
and "aptitude" tests15 do stigmatize and tend to become self-
sor. This admission conveys a double-edged truth. It implies that I have been judged wor-
thy under the regime of standardized testing and that I might be grateful to the testers for
this. On the other hand, the fact that I have taken many standardized tests should help me
empathize with "a consumer perspective and analysis of ETS as judge and gatekeeper for
millions of 'oung Americans." NADER REPORT at xi. Second, in some of my more impecu-
nious moments, I have written a few LSAT questions. Third, as a former member and
chairman of an admissions committee, I have used LSAT scores in making decisions about
law school applicants. Finally, and perhaps most awkward for my claim of objectivity, I am
a member of the Test Development and Research Committee of the Law School Admission
Council (LSAC), a group that the Nader Report characterizes as "the client organization con-
vened by ETS to sponsor the LSAT." Id. at 18. But cf. id. at 220 ("[T]his Council enjoyed a
reputation as the most independent and probing of the ETS client organizations.") All of
this, I suppose, goes to show that Nairn and his associates are right: the tentacles of ETS
stretch everywhere. See p. 435 & note 10 infra.
10. The aspects of the Nader Report that prompt this characterization include a procliv-
ity toward sensationalism in description and toward ascription of guilt by association. Con-
sider, for example, the revelation that a hotel and conference center complex owned by
ETS housed a meeting of "a secret society of European nobility, world leaders and
multinational executives," which "featured a discussion of the neutron bomb." NADER RE-
PORT at 39-40. Then there is the chapter linking ETS to Nazi policies of "eugenic" steriliza-
tion. Id. at 161-96. But the ad hominem flavor of the expose is perhaps best revealed by the
glossary. This glossary is not a list of the technical terms or important concepts in psycho-
logical testing. Instead, the "glossary" is nothing less-or more-than a cast of characters,
with such edifying entries as "Carnegie Corporation of New York: One of the founders of
ETS." Id. at 548.
11. Brownstein & Nairn, Tests That Can Cripple Carriers, READER'S DIG., Mar. 1980, at
157.
12. Seligman, Better Than Dice, FORTUNE, Mar. 10, 1980, at 43.
13. Smith, Nader Assails ETS, 207 Sci. 508 (1980). Among other discussions of the study
are Bourgeois, Multiple-Choice Anxiety, MACLEANS, Feb. 4, 1980, at 39; Fallows, The Tests and
the "Brightest": How Fair Are the College Boards? ATLANTIC, Feb. 1980, at 37; Wynne, The
Collt'ge Testing Controversy, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1980, at 26, col. 4.
14. Se, NADER REPORT at 43-54.
15. Nader and his associates have a field day debunking inflated, and often dated,
claims about the ability of tests to measure intelligence or mental capacity. Most educa-
tional psychologists concede that there are no "intelligence" or "aptitude" tests that mea-
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fulfilling prophecies.16 Misuse of test scores by persons who should
know better is disconcertingly common. 7 Educational and employ-
ment decisions are often based on tests that have little or no dem-
onstrated ability to predict long-term professional success' 8 and
that typically have a disproportionate impact on the poor, on
blacks, on Hispanics, and on other groups.' 9
In itself, this might seem a sufficient indictment of the whole
testing enterprise, and if all the Nader Report did was to reiterate
these well-known facts, the only grounds for complaint might be
packaging or price. 20 But the book brings so many other accusa-
tions against ETS that the organization begins to resemble the dia-
sure innate mental capacity. See E. HILGARD, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 404 (3d ed,
1962) ("Intelligence is that which an intelligence test measures."); J. SATTLER, AsSESShIENT OF
CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE 8 (rev. ed. 1974) (innate mental capacity can never be measured
directly). All that existing tests can measure are limited sorts of achievements; and the less
recently the skills in question have been acquired, the more likely it is that the test will be
labeled an intelligence or aptitude test. Cf. Anastasi, Abilities and the Measurement ofAchieve-
ment, in 5 NEw DIRECTIONS FOR TESTING AND MEASUREMENT 1 (W. Schrader ed. 1980)
(cognitive tests measure "developed abilities").
Educators in law and medicine have adopted a simple expedient to circumvent the objec-
tion that the LSAT and the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) do not measure pro-
fessional aptitude. They let the letter "A" stand for "Admission" rather than "Aptitude."
But see Law School Admission Council, 1980-81 Law School Admission Bulletin and LSAT
Preparation Material 4 (describing test as measuring "mental abilities important in the
study of law") [hereinafter cited as LSAT Bulletin]. This strategem possesses the important
virtue of honesty, but it leaves the test users wide open to an obvious question: if the tests
do not measure professional aptitude, why should they be used in determining admissions
to professional schools?
16. See NADER REPORT at 5-27.
17. Until quite recently, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
used LSAT scores in hiring decisions. NADER REPORT at 232. That even those for whom
the LSAT is designed, the law schools, sometimes place undue reliance on the scores, is
shown by the fact that in 1978, the Law School Admission Council felt impelled to distrib-
ute a set of "cautionary policies," urging member schools not to set any kind of "passing"
score on the LSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law school. Law School Admission
Council, Cautionary Policies Concerning Use of I. The Law School Admission Test (LSAT)
II. The Law School Data Assembly Service (LSDAS) III. The Law School Candidate Refer-
ral Service (LSCRS) 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cautionary Policies]. The Nader Report
provides more anecdotal evidence of misuse. The opening chapter consists mostly of "case
histories"-tearjerkers, really--of students who were misjudged, by themselves or others,
because of low board scores; and nine pages are devoted to the plight of an unnamed
blind student who suffered retinal detachment and further impairment of his vision be-
cause unnamed law schools refused to waive their requirement (or were not asked to do
so-the account is not clear on this point) that all applicants submit an LSAT score. NADER
REPORT at 14-22.
18. See NADER REPORT at 76-81.
19. Id. at 110; see R. SAMUDA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING OF AMERICAN MINORITIES 1-3
(1975).
20. The book costs thirty dollars, a hefty sum for a publication that lacks a useful in-
dex, is not typeset, and is bound in paper.
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bolical corporate villain of the latest Trevanian thriller: 2' an insen-
sitive, immoral, secretive multinational enterprise, complete with
its own dreadfully efficient security force and nearly omniscient
computer network, 23 callously forcing a useless product upon
unsuspecting consumers and ruthlessly crushing helpless oppo-
nents.24 Although this may sound more like fiction than fact, it
would be surprising if at least a few of the unflattering features of
the portrait did not have some basis in reality. Charges of compla-
cency, insensitivity, secretiveness and arrogance on the part of a
major corporation that enjoys monopoly power have a certain
plausibility, and ETS probably deserves a good, swift kick from
time to time. The Nader Report does its utmost to deliver the blow,
but its delivery is flawed by its unbalanced stance.
The National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) report cov-
ers much of the same ground as the Nader Report, but it focuses
specifically on the LSAT. Prepared by a longstanding critic of
standardized testing, David White, under a grant from the Na-
tional Institute of Education, this report also picks and chooses
from the available research to support certain conclusions, but the
argumentation is tighter, more sophisticated, and less infected with
obvious errors and contradictions. The report includes an elabo-
21. TREVANIAN, SHIBUMI (1979).
22. Trevanian's implacably evil opponent is the "Mother Company," a consortium of
major international petroleum, communications, and transportation corporations that con-
trols the western world's energy and information, and dictates to the CIA and heads of
state. Id. at 25. Likewise, Nairn's opponent, the Educational Testing Service, comprises "an
international network with more outposts than the U.S. Department of Defense, and ...
extends . . . 'from Antarctica to Zaire.'" NADER REPORT at 29. Its leaders dine with as-
sorted "dukes, counts and statesmen." Id. at 40. Its agents act "on instructions from the
ETS central office" and move to "rendezvous points through the streets of Belgrade,
Yugoslavia; Cape Town, South Africa; Natchez, Mississippi; Scranton, Pennsylvania;
Moscow, Idaho; Kathmandu, Nepal; Morgantown, West Virginia; Stuttgart, Germany;
Queens, New York; Benghazi, Libya; Malibu, California; Fort Wayne, Indiana; and
Montivideo, Uruguay." Id. at 29.
23. Trevanian calls the computer system employed by his Mother Company the Fat
Boy. TREVANIAN, supra note 21, at 15. Nairn tells us that ETS uses "The Wizard of OS."
NADER REPORT at 28. Fat Boy is fed facts through "the constant work of an army of me-
chanics and technicians." TREVANIAN, supra note 21, at 15. The Wizard is tended by "[s]ev-
enty technicians and a staff of IBM consultants [who] work three shifts daily." NADER RE-
PORT at 28. Fat Boy contains "a medley of information from all the computers in the West-
ern World . . . the most delicate information, and the most mundane. If you lived in the
industrialized West, Fat Boy had you." TREVANIAN, supra note 21, at 15. The Wizard
"coordinates the largest data bank of personal educational and psychological information
in the world: it sorts files on more than thirty-two million persons from one hundred na-
tions." NADER REPORT at 28.
24. Trevanian's Mother Company uses CIA assassins to do away with harmless opposi-
tion. TREVANIAN, supra note 21, at 299. ETS relies on the Washington, D.C., law firm of
Wilmer & Pickering to cut intopro se litigants with "legal micro-surgery." NADER REPORT at 284.
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rate intuitive analysis of several sample LSAT questions, which sug-
gests that black-white cultural differences might affect the re-
sponses.25 It also includes a criticism of law school teaching and
grading practices.26 It argues that LSAT scores, as opposed to
college grades, have little value for admissions purposes, 27 and that
undergraduate grades have much less of an adverse impact on
blacks.2 8 It urges that reliance on LSAT scores be reduced or elimi-
nated, or that the scores of minorities be adjusted upward in some
fashion. 29
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF) report is more modest in scope and less radical in its
call for reforms in law school admissions. Like the Nader and the
NCBL reports, the MALDEF Report insists that the LSAT is racially
and economically biased. 0 Nonetheless, accepting the view that
"'[p]sychometricians can give us valuable tools, but they must not
be misused,' "31 it proposes several "alternative admissions mod-
els"'32 designed to make inore places available to minority students
while continuing to use LSAT scores. This portion of the report
should prove particularly useful to those law school administrators,
faculty, and students concerned with setting admissions policy.
33
II. The Issues
Two fundamental criticisms of the LSAT emerge from the three
books: first, the test is economically, culturally, and racially biased;
second, the test is an inaccurate measure of the qualities law stu-
25. NCBL Report at 63-89.
26. Id. at 108-27.
27. Id. at 22-43, 100-01.
28. Id. at 101-03, 106.
29. Id. at 131-45.
30. The discussion of this point is confused, and at one point the report attempts to
dismiss the whole issue of cultural bias as "obfuscatory." MALDEF REPORT at 19.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 39-61. The models are proffered as "alternatives" to a system that would ad-
mit only those students whose college grade point averages and LSAT scores, when com-
bined according to a certain linear equation, would give them the highest predicted grades
in their first year of law school. Most law school admissions officers would deny that admis-
sions decisions are inexorably fixed by such a crude and mechanical process. See Evans, Ap-
plications and Admissions to ABA Accredited Law Schools: An Analysis of National Data for the
Class Entering the Fall of 1976, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1975-1977, at
551, 622 (1977) (Report No. LSAC-77-1); cf. note 100 infra (describing admissions process
that uses LSAT, grades, and other factors).
33. In exploring some of the alternatives to blind reliance on "the numbers," the
MALDEF Report, in contrast to the other two reports, includes some original empirical re-
search: a "pilot study" of applicants to three San Francisco Bay Area schools. MALDEF
REPORT at 58-61. One feature of this research is criticized below. See note 100 infra.
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dents and lawyers should have. If these criticisms were as strongly
supported as the three reports suggest, testing should cease. 34
This section therefore analyzes these two criticisms. I conclude that
the complaints against the LSAT are overstated, but that the rea-
sons for relying on test scores to make selections among applicants
who are all evidently capable of doing reasonably well in law school
are less impressive than many admissions officers and faculty mem-
bers assume.
A. Test Bias
Unfortunately, the clarity of the debate about test bias is dimin-
ished by the slipperiness of a short word like "bias," or for that
matter, a long one like "discrimination." 35 Educational psycholo-
gists have spawned a variety of technical definitions of test bias, not
all of which are consonant with the legal concepts of equal protec-
tion and nondiscrimination.3 6 It is therefore helpful to analyze the
issue by using familiar terms from employment-discrimination liti-
gation before turning to the psychometric definitions of bias.
The criticism concerning test bias does not allege discrimination
in the sense of disparate treatment. Schools that demand LSAT
scores require them for almost all applicants.3 7 Rather, the argu-
ment is that, like a law that prohibits the rich and the poor alike
from sleeping under bridges or stealing bread, the test has a dispa-
rate impact on minority applicants. This effect is said to arise, first,
34. If, as the Nader Report claims, using the tests is on a par with consulting Ouija
boards and rolling dice, "truth in testing" legislation is far too mild a palliative. In view of
the adverse impact of standardized testing on blacks, the NAACP, among others, has called
for a testing moratorium. R. SAMUDA, supra note 19, at 4-5. In evaluating the abolitionist
position, it is well to distinguish between, on one hand, the use of "intelligence" tests, such
as the WISC and Stanford-Binet, to place children reared outside the white, middle-class
culture in special education classes for the "mentally retarded," and, on the other hand,
the use of other standardized tests in college, graduate, and professional school admissions.
This review focuses only on the latter issue. The Nader Report, by contrast, blurs the dis-
tinction between the two kinds of tests by viewing all standardized testing as a monolithic
device to perpetuate class distinctions. See NADER REPORT at 117-19. For discussions of the
distinctive cultural-bias and proper-use problems with children's "intelligence" tests, see,
for example, Parents In Action On Special Education v. Hannon, 49 U.S.L.W. 2087 (N.D.
Ill., July 7, 1980); J. SATrLER, supra note 15, at 25-49; Messe, Crano, Messe, & Rice, Evalu-
ation of the Predictive Validity of Tests of Mental Ability for Classroom Performance in Elementay
Grades, 71 J. EDUc. PsYcH. 233 (1979).
35. See Williams, Preference, Prejudice and Difference--Racial Reasoning in Unfree Markets,
3 REG., MarJApr. 1979, at 39.
36. See note 95 infra.
37. At most law schools, the requirement is waived for handicapped students. See Law
School Admission Service, Operations Reference Book § 2, at 17 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as LSAS Reference Book]; LSAT Bulletin, supra note 15, at 9. But see note 17 supra (dis-
cussing Nader Report's account of plight of blind applicant).
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because more affluent students have access to expensive cram
courses, and second, because the phrasing and content of the
LSAT questions make the correct answers more apparent to major-
ity applicants of higher socio-economic status.3 8
The fact of disproportionate impact is undeniable. Oddly, the
discrepancy in the mean scores of majority and minority applicants
is rarely reported, but it appears that, on the average, whites score
approximately 100 points higher than blacks, Hispanics, and Na-
tive Americans."9 The explanation for this disparity, however, is
less clearcut. Take the cram-course hypothesis advanced by the
Nader Report.40 It can by itself explain the bulk of the disparity only
38. Other reasons are occasionally offered. The NCBL Report, for example, suggests
that "the speed requirement of the LSAT may have a discriminatory impact." NCBL Re-
port at 47. The available evidence does not support, or conclusively disprove, this hypothe-
sis. See Evans & Reilly, The LSAT Speededness Study Revisited: Final Report, in 2 REPORTS OF
LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1970-74, at 191 (1976) (Report No. LSAC-72-3); Rindler, Pit-
falls in Assessing Test Speededness, 16 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 216 (1979).
39. Although the MALDEF Report states that "ETS research conducted in 1973 estab-
lished that there is a 133 point discrepancy between the average white and Black male
LSAT scores and an 89 point discrepancy between the white and Chicano scores,"
MALDEF REPORT at 18, I have been unable to locate any ETS or LSAC study that pro-
vides such figures. My own analysis of the LSAT scores of 1129 applicants for admission to
the College of Law at Arizona State University (ASU) this past year, however, is consistent
with the MALDEF Report. Where the mean LSAT for the 1024 whites was 573, the mean
figure for the 21 blacks, 62 hispanics, and 15 Native Americans was 457, 467, and 491, re-
spectively. Of course, these figures pertain solely to one school and may differ somewhat
from the national picture, but national studies released by LSAC also point to disparities in
the vicinity of 100 points. Although the mean LSAT score is about 525, LSAS Reference
Book, supra note 37, § 2, at 3, and 72 percent of all persons score in the 500 to 800 range,
only 19 percent of blacks and 33 percent of Hispanics register scores in this range. Evans,
supra note 32, at 604.
40. The Nader Report refers to commercial cram-courses to suggest that the poor are
disadvantaged in the competition for high test scores and to attack the representations
of the College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) that short-term coaching can pro-
duce only negligible score gains on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). NADER REPORT
at 96-109. Although commercial coaching establishments are estimated to do about
$10,000,000 worth of business annually, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF MEMORANDIM OF
THE BOSTON REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-THE EFFECTS OF
COACHING ON STANDARDIZED ADMISSION EXAMINATIONS 31 (Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM], the inability of even the largest coaching schools with
franchises across the nation to document advertising representations of dramatic score
increases does not trouble Nairn or his staff, who see this practice as "another routine case
of marginal enterpreneurs caught cutting corners to make a buck." NADER REPORT at 102.
The report is, however, on firmer ground in criticizing the College Board's claims. See
Slack & Porter, The Scholastic Aptitude Test: A Critical Appraisal, 50 HARV. EDUC. REV. 154,
155 (1980). The materials distributed to persons who register for the LSAT contain the
following representation: "There is no evidence available to LSAC, LSAS, or ETS that tak-
ing LSAT preparation courses improves an examinee's score on average or gives an advan-
tage that cannot be attained by conscientious study of the LSAT preparation material in
the Bulletin." LSAT Bulletin, supra note 15, at 17. The latter part of this claim may be cor-
rect, but the use of the phrase "no evidence" instead of the more accurate "no conclusive
evidence" is misleading.
Testing
if three conditions hold: the fees for these courses, which range
from $40 to $300,4t exclude most minority applicants; most major-
ity applicants enroll in the courses; and participation in the courses
raises LSAT scores by an average of approximately 100 points.42
Substantial evidence that any of these conditions holds, however,
is hard to find. The Nader Report relies primarily on a regional staff
investigation by the Federal Trade Commission of twenty-one com-
mercial coaching schools in four metropolitan areas. 43 This study
did not address the first two points,44 and its findings provide little
support for the third condition. According to Nader's staff, the
study found that graduates of one such course scored sixty points
higher, on the average, than did persons who took the test without
commerical coaching.45 Apparently, comparable gains were not
posted by other courses. 46 Moreover, the study did not adequately
consider probable differences in preparation and motivation be-
tween the coached and uncoached students.47 There is some indi-
41. NADER REPORT at 96.
42. These conditions are obviously interrelated. For instance, if coaching boosts scores
by an average of 200 points, then fewer whites would need to enroll in cram-courses to
produce the 100 point disparity.
43. BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at 31. Two SAT preparatory courses in
metropolitan New York were also studied. Id. at 50.
44. A reexamination of the data collected by the Boston office on the two SAT courses
reveals that minorities are not completely excluded from commercial SAT coaching
schools. In fact, the proportion of minority students in the coached population is 10.3
percent-very close to the 11.3 percent figure for the uncoached group. BUREAU OF CON-
SUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTS OF COACHING ON STANDARDIZED
ADMISSION EXAMINATIONS, REVISED STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DATA GATHERED BY BOSTON
REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 9 (Mar. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
REVISED STATISTICAL ANALYSES]. The Bureau's definition of "minority," however, may in-
clude Asian Americans. Blacks do tend to cluster in the uncoached group, representing 6.9
percent of the uncoached, but only 3.7 percent of the coached students. Id. Furthermore,
although student responses indicated that the parents of 49 percent of the uncoached
group had incomes of less than $18,000, only 31 percent of the parents of students who
obtained commercial coaching had similarly low incomes. Id. at 8.
45. NADER REPORT at 102. The published version of the Boston Staff Memorandum does
not report such a result, but the Nader Report indicates that this portion of the staff's study
was 'edited out [by the Commission] and ... [has] never before been released to the pub-
lic." Id. at 106. In fact, the published version of the study concludes that, whereas coaching
is "dramatically effective" for the SAT, the effect on LSAT scores is sometimes "marginal."
BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at 157. The regional staff, however, argues
that the lack of susceptibility of the LSAT to commercial coaching is merely "apparent"
and that such susceptibility might be demonstrated by further research. Id. at 157.
46. Not having seen the unpublished portion of the Boston Staff Memorandum, I can
only assume that the failure of the Nader Report to mention gains for any other LSAT
cram-courses is deliberate. By my count when reading the Boston study, between 14 and
20 LSAT courses were investigated. See BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at
ix-x, 37-40, 50. Yet the Nader staff states that the sixty-point gain was posted in one "of
the two LSAT courses studied." NADER REPORT at 102.
47. If the persons who enroll in commercial coaching schools were better prepared for
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cation that, in view of such differences between the two groups, lit-
tle of the sixty-point discrepancy can be attributed to participation
in the course itself.48 Given such negative findings, it seems doubt-
ful that the cram-course hypothesis can explain more than a very
small portion of the disparate impact of the LSAT.
49
Nevertheless, concern over minority access to commercial cram-
courses is only part, and perhaps a small part,5° of the complaint
that the LSAT is a disciminatory instrument. It is also possible that
the questions are biased against minorities. The NCBL Report de-
velops this thesis through a lengthy examination of selected ques-
the LSAT to begin with or were more highly motivated, the sixty-point difference between
the mean LSAT score for coached and uncoached candidates might not reflect the effect
of coaching at all. See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Notice to Recipients of the Boston
Regional Office Report on the Effects of Coaching on Standardized Admission Examina-
tions (May 1979). The FTC released the Boston study to the public with the admonition
that the study "'has several major flaws in the data analysis, making the results
unreliable,'" NADER REPORT at 106 (quoting from page stapled to cover of BOSTON STAFF
MEMORANDUM, supra note 40), and with the further statement that "the Commission specifi-
cally believes that some of the conclusions in the study are not supported by the evidence
obtained in the investigation," BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 40 (title page).
The Nader Report dismisses the Commission's reservations as purely "technical." NADER
REPORT at 104. Although we are told that the Boston Office "accumulated an information
base unprecedented in the history of coaching studies," id. at 101, Nader concludes that
the inability of the Boston office to demonstrate that coaching caused any gains on the SAT
or the LSAT arose only because "there were not enough data available," id. at 104. In-
deed, it is ETS that emerges as the real villain. It seems that ETS beseiged the Commission
with methodological criticisms of the Boston report, and the reticence of the FTC to en-
dorse its staff's report represented, in part, "covering the Commission's flanks from ETS
disapproval." Id.
48. When the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection attempted to correct for at least
some of the differences in the composition of the coached and uncoached groups that took
the SAT, it found that the gap in mean SAT scores between the two groups disappeared
or diminished greatly. See REVISED STATISTICAL ANALYSES, supra note 44, at 20, 29.
49. This conclusion by no means implies that coaching is never effective, that it might
not be of some benefit to minorities, or that egalitarian concern about access to cram-
courses is entirely misplaced. For example, analysis of the effectiveness of commercial
cram-courses is complicated by the fact that a number of undergraduate colleges offer
preparation for the LSAT. BOSTON STAFF MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at 41. Further-
more, it may be that certain kinds of persons benefit from extended drill or advice on how
to take multiple choice tests whereas others do not. SAT data, for example, suggest that
"overachievers"-those who do worse on standardized examinations than would be pre-
dicted from their grade point averages or class ranks-find cram-courses beneficial while
most other students do not. See REVISED STATISTICAL ANALYSES, supra note 44, at i-ii. For a
comprehensive review of the SAT coaching studies, see Slack & Porter, supra note 40.
Of course, to the extent that low-income or minority students have access to inexpensive
or free preparatory courses, or can achieve similar results by a conscientious program of
self-study based on preparatory materials supplied by testing organizations, the egalitarian
concern is mitigated. In this connection, the Nader Report's call for an increase in official
advice to students on how to be "test-wise" is quite appropriate. See NADER REPORT at
92-95.
50. See note 40 supra.
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tions from the LSAT Bulletin distributed to candidates. The NCBL
charges that the phrasing or content of a number of the Bulletin's
sample questions displays insensitivity to minority-group traditions,
ignorance of minority-community values, assumptions contrary to
those of minority-group members, prejudicial stereotypes about
minority-group members, disregard of bilingual concerns, unnec-
essary confusion with black standard English, and ignorance of the
history of black culture.5 ' These are serious accusations. Before ac-
cepting them at face value, it would be useful to know whether the
sample questions flagged by the NCBL Report do in fact prove
more difficult for minority candidates. This is a question that can-
not be resolved by armchair research. It could have been investi-
gated, however, by administering the sample test to matched
groups of black and white students. 52
In fact, a number of statistical studies have examined the possi-
bility that questions actually used on the LSAT are biased in this
sense.5 3 The most recent involved 195 LSAT questions and thou-
sands of minority students.54 Thirty-eight questions appeared to be
harder for either blacks or Hispanics, 55 but nearly twice this num-
ber proved easier for these groups.5 6 Thus, the NCBL Report may
be correct in suggesting that certain questions are more difficult for
blacks than for equally able whites and that some of these questions
51. See NCBL Report at 63-88.
52. Other research designs are also possible. See Schmeiser & Ferguson, Performance of
Black and White Students on Test Materials Containing Content Based on Black and White Cultures,
15 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 193 (1978).
53. E.g., Swineford, Comparisons of Black Candidates and Chicano Candidates with White
Candidates, in 2 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1970-74, at 261 (1976) (Report
No. LSAC-72-6).
54. L. Wightman, Study of LSAT Item Performance for Different Subgroups (Oct.
1979 draft). The questions were all taken from one form of the LSAT then in use. Stu-
dents, taking the test in December 1976, were divided into five categories: black men, black
women, Chicano men and women, white men, and white women. Id. at 6. The number in
each category ranged from 915 for the Chicano group to 1,874 for the black men. Id.
55. The difficulty of each question was determined from the item-characteristic curves
of each question for each ethnic group. An item-characteristic curve attempts to display the
probability of a correct response as a function of the ability of the persons taking the test.
See Hambelton & Cook, Latent Trait Models and Their Use in the Analysis of Educational Test
Data, 14 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 75, 78-81 (1977). For discussions of the relative merits of
the various statistical techniques for detecting bias in individual questions, see Ironson &
Subkoviak, A Comparison of Several Methods of Assessing Item Bias, 16 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT
209 (1979); Rudner, Getson, & Knight, A Monte Carlo Comparison of Seven Biased Item Detec-
tion Techniques, 17J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 1 (1980).
56. Seventy-one questions were found to be easier for one minority group or another.
For each of the minority groups, the number of easier questions exceeded the number of
harder ones. L. Wightman, supra note 54 (table 15). For white women, however, there was
an excess of three harder questions over easier ones. Id.
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should be eliminated; 57 but it would not seem that the test as a
whole is biased in this sense. 58
This leaves us in an awkward spot. If neither the existence of
commercial cram-courses nor the cultural bias seen in the formula-
tion of specific questions provides a satisfactory account of the dis-
parity in majority-minority LSAT scores, what does? The sugges-
tion that the disparity has a substantial genetic component is not
likely to be greeted with enthusiasm. 59 As a purely scientific matter,
the evidence on racial-ethnic differences in performance on intel-
lectual tests can accommodate a wide range of views of the genetic
hypothesis. 60 Fortunately, this perennial and divisive debate need
not be resolved here. As the MALDEF Report points out, the groups
that do poorly on the LSAT are the very same groups that have
been victimized by de jure or de facto discrimination in educa-
tion.61 A footrace may go to the swiftest, but those who have not
benefited from a meaningful training program are not likely to fin-
ish in the winner's circle, irrespective of any genetic component of
being fleet of foot. On this view, the score disparities mirror differ-
57. It does not necessarily follow that because this study found a question to differ in
difficulty between two groups, that question should be eliminated. Due to the large sample
sizes, minute differences in difficulty can be statistically significant. For illustration, sup-
pose that difficulty is measured on a scale ranging from zero to one and that the difficulty
of a question for blacks is found to be 0.5001, compared to 0.5000 for whites. If these
numbers had been derived from only a handful of observations on black and white test-
takers, one might think that the difference of 0.0001 would not show up if the perform-
ances of a much larger number of students had been examined. Because it is risky to gen-
eralize from such small samples, one might say that the difference is not statistically
significant. On the other hand, if the difference had been derived from many thousands of
observations, it would be harder to dismiss as a sampling error. Instead, one might con-
clude that the difference is statistically significant; it probably reflects a true difference be-
tween the general populations of black and white test-takers. Nevertheless, this difference
of 0.0001 might be of little practical consequence. It might have so slight an impact on ac-
tual scores as to be negligible, and it might be balanced by another question that is slightly
easier for blacks. Thoughtful statisticians express this idea by distinguishing between "sta-
tistical" and "practical" significance. See D. MooRE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTRO-
VERsIEs 292 (1979).
58. It is not clear from the study, however, whether the test is on balance easier for mi-
norities when the biased questions are weighted by the degree of bias.
59. The MALDEF Report calls this suggestion "eugenicist-type." MALDEF REPORT at 19.
60. See, e.g., J. LOEHLIN, G. LINDZEY, & J. SPUHLER, RACE DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE
238-39 (1975) ("A rather wide range of positions concerning the relative weight... [of bi-
ases and inadequacies of tests, of environmental factors, and of genetic factors] can reason-
ably be taken on the basis of current evidence.") Bodmer & Cavalli-Sforza, Intelligence and
Race, SCIENTIFIC Am., Oct. 1970, at 19-29 ("currently available data are inadequate to re-
solve . . . [the] question in either direction" of whether "there could be a genetic compo-
nent in the mean difference in IQ between races").
61. MALDEF REPORT at 19-20; see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law School Admis-
sion Council at 15, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(one examination shows that more than 60% of potential minority law-school candidates at-
tended unlawfully segregated public schools).
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ences in educational achievement, which reflect fundamental social
inequities rather than variations in innate abilities.
To be sure, this analysis-which is the ETS party line 6 2 -
presupposes that tests like the LSAT measure certain educational
attainments with at least moderate accuracy. 63 In addition, it does
not completely refute the charge of test bias, for it is also possible
that the LSAT systematically understates the achievements of low-
scoring groups or overstates those of high-scoring groups. If this
were so, differences in group means would be observed, but these
differences would exaggerate the disparities in achievement that
are actually present. There is a statistical method for examining
this possibility, and it has been applied to the LSAT. To describe
this procedure, it is best first to explain the techniques for assessing
the test's general accuracy. It is to this issue, which educational psy-
chologists usually call test validity, that we now turn.
B. Test Validity
Standardized tests are measuring instruments. Like college
grades, they measure something about intellectual performance.
To understand how we can tell whether the measurements they
provide are accurate, an extended analogy may be useful. Consider
a mechanical device, say a bathroom scale, that measures some
physical property like weight. The specific scale I have in mind
keeps insisting that I am overweight. To check its accuracy, I might
try putting the same heavy book on it every morning. If the meas-
ured weight varied dramatically from day to day, I might decide
that the scale was not working correctly. In the literature on
testing, the comparable measure is called reliability, and the relia-
bility of the LSAT is said to be quite high.64 The fact that my bath-
room scale gives consistent measurements, however, does not mean
62. See Turnbull, Foreword to R. SAMUDA, supra note 19, at vii, ix (Foreword by Presi-
dent of ETS).
63. This supposition is scrutinized below. See pp. 443-53 infra.
64. The LSAS Operations Reference Book, supra note 35, § 2, at 7, states:
An "internal consistency" reliability coefficient is computed for each edition of the
LSAT and is an estimate of the degree to which individuals would keep the same rela-
tive standing in a group, if equivalent forms of the test were administered to all mem-
bers of a representative group with effects of practice and fatigue removed ....
The average reliability of the scores on recent forms of the LSAT is .92 for a group
of candidates very similar to the total group of candidates tested. This is certainly high
enough to justify the use of the scores in individual counseling and prediction.
For a clearer discussion of the methods of calculating reliability, see A. ANASTASI, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL TESTING 78-94 (3d ed. 1968). For a more involved treatment, see Cudeck, A Com-
parative Study ofIndicesfor Internal Consistency, 17 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 117 (1980).
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that it provides correct measurements. So, too, the finding that the
LSAT is "reliable" does not prove that it is accurate.
Recognizing that internal consistency is not sufficient, I might try
to compare the readings given by my scale with those of other
scales. This approach, though, is less useful with the LSAT. Sup-
posedly, there are no other tests that measure exactly what the
LSAT measures. 65 Moreover, even if all the bathroom scales I ex-
amined were in agreeement, it could still be that they were all
wrong. There might have been some uniform defect in their man-
ufacture or some recent environmental change that affected the
whole lot.
I might next decide to take my scale apart to look for a defect. If
my knowledge of physics and my mechanical acumen were ade-
quate, I might be able to assure myself that all is well. In testing jar-
gon, I would be looking for facial validity. The NCBL Report does
a fair amount of this. For example, questions involving quantitative
comparisons are criticized for lacking facial validity, 6 6 and even
those involving "principles and cases" are challenged on the
ground that they "do not simulate the actual legal practice of attor-
neys."' 67 Although these particular criticisms seem somewhat over-
65. It would make little sense to use college grades (another measure of potential for
successful law study or practice) as a measure of the accuracy of the LSAT. The LSAT is
intended to measure something that is not measured or is measured less adequately by
college grades. Nevertheless, the assertion that other standardized examinations are
unsuited to law school admissions is probably false. See Schrader & Pitcher, The Advanced
Tests of the Graudate Record Examinations as a Predictor of Law School Grades, in 2 REPORTS OF
LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1970-74, at 47 (1976) (Report No. LSAC-70-5); cf. Slack &
Porter, supra note 40, at 167-69 (achievement tests predict college academic performance
better than SAT).
66. NCBL Report at 56. The logic seems to be that because the quantitative compari-
sons sometimes involve mathematical operations such as squaring numbers or taking
square roots, and because few lawyers perform such mathematical manipulations in advis-
ing clients, writing briefs, or their other tasks, the quantitative questions lack content valid-
ity. This seems too narrow a view of facial validity. The ability to perform mathematical
operations may not be tapped directly in the study or practice of law, but the ability to
work with mathematical and logical operators may be evidence of the ability to think
clearly. As Professor Lempert reminds us, "[w]hatever enables lawyers to think more
clearly is of practical importance." Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021,
1056 (1977). In other words, the LSAT may have "construct validity" even where it lacks
"'content validity." See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(B) (1979).
67. The reason for the NCBL Report's criticism is that "a test which considers only one
response correct does not fit the rationale of a legal system which is grounded on an ad-
versary model in which both sides are represented by competent counsel." NCBL Report
at 58.
Although questions that are phrased in terms of "principles and cases," "issues and
facts," or the like, might obviously be thought relevant to legal study and practice, the use
of such questions poses a dilemma. If the questions use standard legal terms with their
conventional meanings, then these questions can be attacked as unfairly advantaging per-
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drawn,68 even more compelling demonstrations of the absence of
facial validity should not be decisive. No argument about the rele-
vance of the questions in the test to the measurement of certain
qualities could be fully persuasive without some good theory of
what legal "aptitude" is and how tests work. No such theory is cur-
rently available.
If my physical inspection of the bathroom scale was not entirely
convincing, what more could I do to test the scale's accuracy? I
might weigh some convenient objects and then use those weights to
make predictions as to how the objects will behave when put into a
cylindrical bucket and floated in my bathtub. If I knew the density
of the water, the area of the bucket's base, and the weight of the
bucket, I could use Archimedes' principle to calculate how deep
the bucket with each object would be submerged. If, on per-
forming the experiment, my observations of the submerged depths
matched my predictions, then I might conclude that the scale
works pretty well after all. In the lingua franca of psychometrics,
this experiment would be an investigation of predictive validity.
In employment-discrimination cases, predictive validity translates
into job-relatedness. Even if a test has a disparate impact on a
protected class, scores can be used to exclude candidates for hiring
or promotion as long as the test predicts job performance with rea-
sonable accuracy. 69 Although law schools are not employers of
sons who have been exposed to legal materials. See id. at 59. On the other hand, if the
terms are defined to have special meanings for the purposes of the test, the questions can
be criticized as unfairly confusing individuals with prior legal knowledge. In the end, it
may be that the old favorites, such as "reading comprehension," are the best. Surely it
would be a narrow view of facial validity that would deny the relevance of questions that
test whether an individual can read a few paragraphs and summarize the main ideas.
68. Why should it be necessary to "simulate . . . actual legal practice" in order to see
whether aspirants to the bar can acquire the skills they will need to achieve professional
success? If only such a simulation could provide facial validity, then almost everything in a
student's history (including his grades, almost all work experience, almost all letters of rec-
ommendation, and almost all other academic and social achievements) would lack facial va-
lidity.
69. There is some confusion over the applicable evidentiary standards in employment-
discrimination cases. See Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979). The leading cases are
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is usually read to require a showing of predictive validity in
an action brought under Title VII whenever disparate impact is apparent. See Comment,
Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 793, 793 (1978). Washington v. Davis, in contrast, is generally understood not to re-
quire such validation in equal-protection cases unless there is also distinct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent. See Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 540, 543-44 (1977). Although this distinction between the evidentiary stan-
dards in Title VII litigation and those in equal-protection cases finds support in the
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their students, it is instructive to consider how they might defend
their use of the LSAT if Title VII standards were applicable.70
Among other things, they might want to contend that the LSAT
has predictive validity. But exactly what is the LSAT supposed to
predict? If success as a lawyer is the appropriate criterion, then no
direct demonstration of predictive validity is available. To be sure,
some current research is seeking quantified measures of profes-
sional success, and it may even generate some information about
the value of the LSAT as a prognosticator of career achieve-
ments. 71 But I, for one, would be quite surprised if the LSAT
proves to be more than marginally correlated with success in the
practice of law. After all, the test is administered early in a lawyer's
professional life, and even its most dogmatic defenders would have
to concede that it measures only one or two of the qualities neces-
sary for outstanding professional accomplishments.
Nevertheless, to conclude on the strength of this argument that
the LSAT is devoid of predictive validity would be too hasty. The
same analysis would condemn college grades and many other fac-
tors commonly considered by admissions personnel. For instance,
undergraduate grading practices have an adverse impact on blacks
and Hispanics.7 2 Because, as the Nader Report puts it, "the validity
of grades in general as predictors of later success has not been
upheld by evidence,' 73 it would seem that our Title VII analysis
Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis, it is not clear that the distinction is appropriate.
The cases can be interpreted to create a uniform standard under which a prima facie case
of discrimination is established by a showing of both disparate impact and questionable fa-
cial validity. Under this approach, the LSAT might have sufficient facial validity to avoid
the need for formal validation. For present purposes, however, it is more revealing to ask
whether the sort of predictive validity that is sometimes demanded in Title VII cases can
be shown.
70. The Nader Report seizes upon an idea tentatively mentioned by Professor Millard
Ruud, who once asked whether a law school might be liable under Tide VII, as if it were
an employer, because admissions decisions affect employment opportunities. NADER RE-
PORT at 230-32 (reporting remarks made by Ruud at 1971 conference). This theory spar-
kles with originality, but no attorney familiar with Title VII litigation would be surprised to
learn that "[e]ight years after Griggs, no such case is known to have been brought." Id. at
232.
71. See Carlson & Werts, Relationships Among Law School Predictors, Law School Perform-
ance, and Bar Examination Results, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1975-1977,
at 211, 212-13 (1977) (Report No. LSAC-73-2).
72. National data indicate that 40 percent of white candidates for admission to law
schools in 1976 had undergraduate grade point averages of 3.25 or better. In contrast.
only 13 percent of black applicants and 22 percent of Hispanic students posted averages in
this range. Evans, supra note 39, at 604. All the books reviewed here minimize the signifi-
cance of these disparities. But see note 100 infra (discussing possible significance of dis-
parities).
73. NADER REPORT at 80. The Nader Report cites a 1965 American College Testing re-
search report that reviewed 46 studies, which "defined and measured professional achieve-
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precludes reliance on college grades as well as LSAT scores.7 4 To
climb out of the hole we seem to have dug ourselves into, we can
shift the focus from on-the-job performance, which is difficult to
measure, 75 to success in a training program, which is more tracta-
ble.76 If we can assume that a law degree and high grades in law
school are sensible things for people who hire lawyers to look at,77
then we can use success in the training program-in the law
school-as a proxy for professional success. If, in addition, we use
the grade point average obtained at the conclusion of the first year
of law school (FYA) as a measure of success in law school,7 8 then
some relatively simple quantitative analysis of predictive validity be-
comes feasible.
With first-year grades as the criterion, how accurate is the
LSAT? The Nader Report loudly proclaims that the test is essentially
worthless: no better than "random prediction with a pair of dice"
in all but thirteen percent of the cases. 79 To examine this dramatic
claim, I compared two methods for predicting the FYA for stu-
dents in the most recent first-year class at Arizona State University.
First, I made predictions by consulting a table of random numbers.
Second, I used an elementary statistical technique to derive (from
the various LSAT scores and course performances of students in
ment by a multitude of standards, covered eight categories [business, teaching, engineer-
ing, medicine, scientific research, and miscellaneous others, and concluded] . . . 'that
college grades bear little or no relationship to any measures of adult accomplishment.'" Id.
(quoting D. Hoyt, author of ACT report) (footnote omitted).
74. But see note 69 supra (suggesting that use of LSAT may be legitimate under Tide
VII even without proof of predictive validity).
75. See Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing,
1976 Sup. CT. REV. 263, 291 ("criterion validity . . . becomes awesomely complex or
fraught with danger when applied to complex, varied jobs").
76. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court held that Title
VII's requirement that employment tests be job-related could be satisfied by proof that the
test validly predicted performance in a training course. Id. at 248-52. This result is contro-
versial. For a vehement defense of the outcome of the case, see Lerner, Employment Discrim-
ination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 17.
77. This proposition is difficult to prove, or disprove, rigorously. See Lerner, supra note
76, at 18-19.
78. Even if it is agreed that academic performance in law school is an appropriate crite-
rion for measuring the LSAT's predictive validity, the use of first-year grade point aver-
ages can be challenged. There are three principal arguments for using first-year grades.
First, they permit validation on the basis of data that are only one year old instead of two
or three. Second, they are probably highly correlated to cumulative averages at graduation.
Third, most students who depart from law school for academic reasons do so in their first
year, so that prediction of first-year performance seems especially important.
These arguments should in no way preclude the investigation of other criteria for
evaluating predictive validity. For instance, clinical coursework is an important component
of law-school performance, and it might be enlightening to know how the LSATs value in
predicting performance in these courses compares to its validity in predicting FYA.
79. NADER REPORT at 65.
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the previous year's entering class) a simple equation for predicting
FYA on the basis of the LSAT alone. I discovered that the true pic-
ture was almost exactly the opposite of what the Nader Report
claims. For 113 out of 136 students-in eighty-three percent of the
cases-predicting performance from the LSAT was superior to
random prediction.
This result might suggest that the Nader Report's conclusions are
tendentious if not dishonest. The report's derivation of the thir-
teen percent figure, however, indicates that its authors are merely
confused about the statistical method routinely used to assess pre-
dictive validity. This procedure, which goes by such forbidding
names as "linear regression" and "least squares" fitting, is really
quite simple. To expose the flaws in the report's account, a quick
explanation of the method is in order. Imagine that we are asked
to predict how each student accepted at law school X will do in his
or her first year. If we have no information on the grades of
former first-year students, we may as well guess at random. If we
learn, however, that the mean FYA last year was, say 3.18, we
probably can do better by merely predicting that every student will
have a 3.18 this year.8 0 To see just how much better predicting by
the mean is than random guessing, we could use the following pro-
cedure: for each student, check the FYA at the conclusion of the
year, subtract this number from our guess for that student, and
square this difference; then add up these squared deviations from
our guesses.61 If we follow this method first using our random
guesses and then using our 3.18 guess, we will arrive at two num-
bers, each indicating the overall accuracy of the respective methods
of prediction. The smaller the number, the better the prediction.
If we have more information on past performance, we should be
able to do even better in this "least squares" sense. Suppose, for in-
stance, that last year's class consisted of ten persons whose LSAT
scores and FYAs were as follows: 8 2
LSAT: 450 493 555 567 610 618 635 660 691 729
FYA: 3.00 1.93 2.83 3.71 3.24 3.05 2.91 3.53 3.85 3.75
To visualize what these numbers reveal about the relationship be-
tween LSAT scores and FYA, we can draw a picture (sometimes
80. See Efron & Morris, Stein's Paradox in Statistics, SCIENTIFIC AM., May, 1977, at 119.
81. The differences are squared to prevent an instance of overprediction, which would
have a positive sign, from cancelling an instance of equally mistaken underprediction,
which would have a negative sign. Other techniques could also be used to circumvent this
problem. See note 83 infra.
82. The mean for these FYAs remains 3.18.
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called a scattergram) in which FYA is plotted against LSAT scores.
With this graph, we can search for the line that best fits the data.For example, our previous approach of predicting by the mean is
tantamount to drawing a straight line through the cloud of data
points at the height of the mean. As the diagram below suggests,
we can do better by drawing a line that slopes at a different angle
and that intercepts the vertical axis at a different point. In particu-lar, the line sketched below (commonly referred to as the regres-
sion line) can be shown to minimize, relative to all other possible
straight lines, the sum of the squares of the vertical distance be-
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FIGURE 1: REGRESSION LINE AND MEAN LINE
FOR HYPOTHETICAL CLASS AT LAW SCHOOL X
83. The proof involves elementary calculus. See A. ErwARDs, AN INTRODUCTION TOLINEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION 24-26 (1976). This technique of least-squares regres-
sion can be traced back to Newton.
The criticisms of the LSAT that are reviewed here do not question the assumption thatthe line that has the "best" fit is the one that minimizes the sum of the squared differences.
Yet it is not clear that the costs of mistakes in predicting grades increase as rapidly as thesquare of the error in the predictions. Consequently, it might be argued that some other
criterion would be more appropriate. For example, one might seek the line that minimizes
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The method we used to compare the random guess with the 3.18
guess can now be employed to measure how well the regression
line fits the data. We simply calculate the sum of the squared verti-
cal distances between the data points and the line, and compare
this number to the analogous sum for the horizontal line that de-
picts the mean. In this example, the former quantity is 1.62, and
the latter is 2.99. Thus, the regression line has reduced the squared
errors of prediction by an amount of 1.37 (2.99 - 1.62 = 1.37). In
other words, the sloping line "explains" the proportion 1.37/2.99,
or 46 percent, of the total variation from the mean. This propor-
tion (conventionally denoted r 2) reports to what extent the regres-
sion-line method represents an improvement over prediction ac-
cording to the mean; and, of course, this least squares prediction
represents an even greater advance over random methods.
With this understanding of the most commonly used method for
quantifying predictive validity, let us return to the thirteen percent
figure cited in the Nader Report. This number, apparently, is de-
rived from a report of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in
Higher Education. That report does not present a figure for r2 . In-
stead it states that the median "validity coefficient" for the LSAT
was .36.84 This coefficient measures the correlation between FYA
and LSAT scores.85 Squaring it, the Nader Report obtains the figure
of thirteen percent. It is true that the square of the correlation co-
efficient is numerically equal to r 2 as defined above. However, in
stating that this number represents the percentage of cases in
which the LSAT is no better than rolling dice in predicting FYA,
the report makes no less than three elementary mistakes. First, it
treats a median figure as if it pertained to each law school. By defi-
nition, half the schools will achieve better results than this median,
and their use of the LSAT is not impeached by this generalized at-
the sum of the absolute values of the observed deviations. Even so, I would guess that tech-
niques based on such loss functions would not yield a drastically different picture of the ac-
curacy and fairness of the LSAT.
84. See NADER REPORT at 417 n.15, 422 n.32.
85. More precisely, the number is known as a zero-order Pearson product-moment cor-
relation coefficient. J. GUILFORD & B. FRUCHTER, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY
AND EDUCATION 83 (5th ed. 1973). If LSAT scores and FYAs were perfectly correlated, so
that an increase of Ax points in the LSAT always corresponded to an increase of Ay points
in FYA, the value of this coefficient would be one. If differences in LSAT scores bore no
relation to differences in FYA, its value would be zero.
Nairn and his associates mistakenly state that the correlation coefficient involved in the
ETS validity studies is a Spearman, or rank-order, correlation coefficient. Even if the .36
figure were a rank-order correlation, the interpretation of its square offered in the Nader
Report would still be wrong. See id. at 284.
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tack. 6 Second, this derivation assumes that r2 can be directly com-
pared with random prediction. It cannot. For large samples, the
number gives the proportion of the variance explained by using
the regression line instead of the mean to make predictions.87 Be-
cause the mean is itself an improvement over rolling dice, r 2 un-
derstates the superiority of prediction based on the LSAT over
prediction using random methods. Third, even as an indication of
improvement over the mean, the statistic has no simple connection
to the number of instances in which one method works better than
another. Because r2 is calculated by adding up the squared errors
of prediction, a few large errors may yield the same number as
would a great many smaller errors. That is, the magnitude of r 2 is
determined not by whether the individual predictions according to
one method come closer to the mark, but rather by how much closer
these predictions come.88
In sum, the LSAT cannot be so easily dismissed as devoid of pre-
dictive validity. In fact, at most law schools it seems to be at least as
accurate a predictor as undergraduate grades.8 9 Considering Na-
86. Anecdoctal information indicates that the LSAT consistently predicts better for
some schools than for others. The reasons for differences in validity from school to school
have not been explored systematically, and the possibilities are numerous. For example,
some schools may have anonymous grading in the first year, some may use a wider range
of grades, some may have an entering class with widely dispersed LSAT scores, and some
may report FYAs of students who flunk out in the first semester. All these factors should
tend to produce higher correlation coefficients, because they would tend to produce more
discriminating measurements of FYA or to curtail the "range-restriction" effect described
below. See note 88 infra.
87. See pp. 449-50 supra; A. EDWARDS, supra note 83, at 43-44.
88. The statistic r2 is a measure of overall fit, but there is no single number that ade-
quately measures the accuracy of individual predictions. Probable accuracy decreases as
one makes predictions for students whose LSAT scores are increasingly distant from the
mean. See Binder, Considerations of the Place of Assumptions in Correlational Analysis, 14 Am.
PSYCH. 504, 509 (1959).
89. The Nader Report's source states that the median correlation of undergraduate
grade point average with first year law school average is only .25. Willingham & Breland,
The Status of Selective Admissions, in SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 65, 237
(Carnegie Council 1977). Yet the Nader Report does not announce prominently that pre-
dicting law school performance by college grades is a "respectable fraud," no better than
rolling dice in 6 percent (approximately .25 squared) of the cases. Instead, the report ob-
serves in a footnote that "the relative predictive ability of grades and scores swings back
and forth from one time period to another," NADER REPORT at 66 n.*, and it acknowledges
the 6 percent figure only in another footnote two chapters later. Id. at 459 n.9. For evi-
dence in support of this oscillation theory, the report defers to "attorney David White." Id.
The NCBL Report, prepared by White, theorizes that as law schools place more and more
emphasis on the LSAT, they will select students whose LSAT scores are virtually identical.
This restriction of range, White reasons, will cause the measured validity of the LSAT to
diminish, because predictions will then be based on negligible differences in LSAT scores.
As this happens, law schools will return to attaching more importance to undergraduate
grades, leading to a restriction of the range of this predictor, and to the subsequent
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der's earlier achievements and his obvious talents, it is painful to
read this chapter of a report published under his name. Although
the accuracy of the LSAT--even at the limited task of predicting
first year grades-is nothing to write home about,90 it is far supe-
rior to dice.
reemergence of the LSAT as the apparently more valid predictor. NCBL Report at 92-95.
The phenomenon of range restriction is well known to statisticians. See, e.g., Roe, The
Correction for Restriction of Range and the Difference Between Intended and Actual Selection, 39
EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 551 (1979). But if the oscillation theory is to apply to the
median correlation measured in 1976, two conditions must hold: the preponderance of the
law schools must oscillate in phase, and undergraduate grades must show a more restricted
range than the LSAT in the 1976 studies. The NCBL Report points to no data indicating
that these conditions hold. To the contrary, a rough inspection of the evolution of correla-
tions involving LSAT scores and undergraduate grades shows that the median correlation
of LSAT scores with FYA has consistently exceeded that of undergraduate grades.
Schrader, Summary of Law School Validity Studies, 1948-1975, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPON-
SORED RESEARCH, 1975-1977, at 519, 530 (1977) (Report No. LSAC-76-8).
No adequate explanation for this result appears in the Nader or NCBL reports. One pos-
sibility is that "grade inflation" has restricted the range of grades in the applicant popula-
tion, undermining the predictive validity of grades. See Singleton & Smith, Does Grade Infla-
tion Decrease the Reliability of Grades? 15 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 37 (1978). This explanation,
however, would not account for the success of the LSAT in pre-inflationary times. A more
likely explanation is that the correlation of grades across the full spectrum of undergradu-
ate institutions and of departments within institutions ignores important distinctions,
reducing the measured validity. As the Nader and NCBL reports note, most of the previ-
ously published efforts to adjust grades according to the college attended have not been
very successful. NCBL Report at 28-33. Nevertheless, as I have shown elsewhere, a simple
nonlinear model that considers some crude statistics on the college attended can boost the
correlation of FYA with grades by 25 percent. See Kaye, An "A" is an "A" is an "A": An Ex-
ploratory Analysis of a New Method of Adjusting Undergraduate Grades for Law School Admissions
Purposes, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 1980).
It is important to observe that the entire enterprise of comparing the LSAT's correlation
with FYA to that of undergraduate grades may be misdirected. For operational purposes,
the more relevant question is whether using the LSAT in combination with grades to predict
performance is superior to using one of these factors alone. The answer to this question is
clearly affirmative. The 1976 Carnegie study mentioned above, see p. 447 supra, for exam-
ple, reports that the median validity when both LSAT scores and grades are used in a
"multiple" regression equation is .45, compared with .36 for the LSAT alone and .25 for
grades alone. Willingham & Breland, supra, at 237. This finding is one of the reasons
LSAC cautions schools against using a specific LSAT score as a minimum for consideration
for admission. See Cautionary Policies, supra note 17.
90. As I observed above, see note 86 supra, accuracy varies from school to school. Al-
though it is sometimes argued that r2 understates or misstates the accuracy of predictions,
see, e.g., Dawes, Graduate Admissions Variables and Future Success, 187 Sci. 721 (1975); Wolins,
On Squaring Validity Coeffiwients, 37 EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 373, 374 (1977), the
values of r2 for the LSAT at most law schools are hardly overwhelming. Given the limited
power of the LSAT to predict first-year grades, the present system of reporting LSAT
scores to three digits must be questioned. Analysis of data on the 1978-79 first-year class at
Arizona State University College of Law shows that compressing the scale by a factor of 40,
that is, treating scores of 200-239 as a 1, scores of 240-279 as a 2, and so on, does not re-
duce the correlation between a weighted sum of LSAT scores and undergraduate grade
point average (UGPA) on the one hand, and FYA on the other. Thus, the practice of
three-digit reporting may encourage admissions personnel to attach importance to statistic-
ally insignificant differences in LSAT scores.
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But is the LSAT equally accurate in predicting the grades of
blacks, Hispanics, and whites? Although most courts have assumed
in Title VII cases that an inference of discrimination based on dis-
parate impact is refuted by proof of predictive validity,9a a more
refined analysis is plainly necessary. The general finding that a test
beats rolling dice or predicting by the mean still may mask invidi-
ous differences in the predictions for various subgroups. For ex-
ample, a test that consistently underpredicts the performance of
blacks while accurately forecasting the achievements of all other
subgroups will have a high r2 if the degree of underprediction is
not very large or if blacks make up a small percentage of the total
group. Yet such a test unquestionably discriminates against blacks.
The statistical procedure for investigating the possibility of this
type of bias in an apparently valid test is a simple extension of the
least squares method. One merely calculates the regression lines
for the subgroups in question and observes whether there are any
large differences in the slopes, location, and fit of the various
lines.9 2 Every study of this nature has found that the LSAT does
not systematically underpredict the initial academic performance
of blacks or Hispanics. 3 For these subgroups, the LSAT is about as
good a predictor of first-year law-school grades as it is for whites.94
In sum, the principal charges against the LSAT-that it discrimi-
nates on the basis of race and that it has virtually no power to pre-
91. A search of the LEXIS library of federal cases reveals that very few of the Tide
VII cases that have referred to test validity have mentioned either underprediction or dif-
ferential validity. In contrast, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,
29 C.F.R. §§1607.7, 1607.14 (1979), recognize the importance of analysis of predictive va-
lidity by subgroups.
92. For examples of this method, see Hunter, Schmidt, & Hunter, Differential Validity of
Employment Tests by Race: A Comprehensive Review and Analysis, 86 PSYCH. BULL. 721 (1979)
(finding that most employment tests are equally accurate in predicting job performance of
blacks and whites); Linn, Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law School, 27 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 293 (1975). A related, statistically superior technique involves inserting "indicator"
variables for race into the equation for FYA. See Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Pro-
ceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 722 (1980).
93. E.g., Powers, Comparing Predictions of Law School Performance for Black, Chicano, and
White Law Students, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1975-1977, at 721 (1977)
(Report No. LSAC-77-3); Pitcher, Subgroups Validity Study, in 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPON-
SORED RESEARCH, 1975-1977, at 413 (1977) (Report No. LSAC-76-6); Schrader & Pitcher,
Prediction of Law School Grades for Mexican American and Black American Law Students, in 2
REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH, 1970-74, at 715 (1976) (Report No. LSAC-74-8).
These studies generally consider predictions made by the LSAT singly and in combination
with UGPA.
94. In contrast, UPGA has been found to be consistently less valid for predicting law-
school FYA of minority students. Powers, supra note 93, at 747. The NCBL Report ignores
this finding in arguing that UPGA is a fairer and more valid predictor of FYA for blacks.
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dict grades in the first year of law school-partake more of rhetoric
than of reality.
Conclusion
This analysis does not mean that the LSAT is the be-all and end-
all in law school admissions. I have argued that, to the extent one is
interested in finding out how a prospective student will do in his
first-year courses, the LSAT supplies a statistically useful bit of in-
formation, and that this information has roughly the same proba-
tive force for minority and majority candidates.9 5 Nonetheless, ad-
missions personnel should be interested in other information as
wellY6 No one has an a priori right to attend law school simply be-
95. To put it another way, the LSAT discriminates against blacks and Hispanics in the
same way that law school grading systems do. Cf. note 78 supra (discussing reasons for
using FYA as criterion for predictive validity). Some psychometricians contend that for a
test to be used fairly, group membership as well as the individual likelihood of success
must be considered in defining cutoff lines. See, e.g., Cole, Bias in Selection, 10 J. EDUC.
MEASUREMENT 237 (1973); Thorndike, Concepts of Culture Fairness, 8 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT
63 (1971). The three studies reviewed here refer to this literature in order to cast doubt on
the generally accepted regression model of fairness. Indeed, the NCBL Report, in a novel
extension of the Thorndike and Cole models, recommends the deliberate boosting of mi-
nority applicants' scores.
None of the reports, however, recognizes the logical inconsistencies in the Cole and
Thorndike definitions of test fairness. See Linn, supra note 92 (noting such inconsistencies);
Novick & Ellis, Equal Opportunity in Educational and Employment Selection, 32 AM. PSYCH. 306
(1977) (same). Moreover, it is not clear that adopting an alternative quantitative definition
would necessarily open the law school doors to blacks and Hispanics. A study of ACT
scores, high-school rank, and first- and second-year grades at one university, for instance,
found that substitution of the Thorndike definition for the conventional regression model
of test bias would have "changed the results for minorities very little," and would have re-
quired that admissions standards be raised for blacks and lowered for Jews. Silverman,
Barton, & Lyon, Minority Group Status and Bias in College Admissions Criteria, 36 EDUC. &
PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 401, 405 (1976). In short, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that
a test that gives equally accurate predictions for minority and majority applicants does ex-
actly what it should be designed to do. What use should be made of these predictions is an-
other matter, and it is unfortunate that most of the alternative definitions of test fairness
conflate the two issues.
96. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW
SCHOOLS 3 (1979) (Recommendation 1).
The findings of an ETS study are provocative. Questionnaire responses of college sen-
iors who had taken the LSAT revealed that higher scoring students tended to be academic-
ally superior, but to have less confidence in their ability to relate to others on an individual
basis, and to place less importance on security, salary, working with people, and making a
contribution to knowledge in choosing law as a career. Baird, Biographical and Educational
Correlates of Graduate and Professional School Admissions Test Scores, 36 EDUC. & PSYCH. MEAS-
UREMENT 415, 419 (1976). In light of the mild negative correlation between the LSAT and
those personal traits (some which may be important in a lawyer), and in view of the ques-
tionable ability of the LSAT to make meaningful distinctions at the upper end of the score
scale, one admissions strategy worth considering would be to use the LSAT in conjunction
with UGPA and related factors to screen out applicants who present a serious academic
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cause he or she is unusually clever or articulate. 97 In particular,
blacks and Hispanics are being admitted to law schools under legit-
imate affirmative-action programs that do not, ostrich-like, hide
from the fact of disproportionately low LSAT scores among those
groups.98
What is disturbing, then, about the recent spate of law-school ad-
missions exposes, probes, and studies is not the concern with
enhancing minority admissions. Rather, it is the meritocratic as-
sumption-shared by all three reports under review-that admis-
sion to law school is a reward for high undergraduate grades. It is
the common theme, sounded most stridently in the Nader and
NCBL reports, that because use of the LSAT may obstruct efforts
to increase minority admissions, the test should be scrapped. But
experience has shown that, for the present, only overtly race-
conscious programs that guarantee seats for minority candidates
will do much to achieve integration in law schools and in the prac-
ticing bar.P Moreover, it is doubtful that discarding the LSAT
would substantially aid minority enrollments. 00 At the same time,
risk, then to proceed with the selection on the basis of non-academic characteristics. An-
other strategy that may prove more appealing as the number of applications to law school
subsides would be to minimize mistaken predictions of academic success by admitting all
minimally qualified applicants with the clear understanding that many, if not most, of those
admitted will not meet the school's announced standards for retention and graduation.
97. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 225 (1977).
98. See Evans, supra note 32, at 634-36.
99. See id. (analyzing the impact on law school enrollments of race-neutral selection
methods that incorporate consideration of LSAT).
100. All three reports insist that the LSAT has more disparate impact on minority ad-
missions that do undergraduate grades. The Nader Report, for example, laments that "[t]he
lower LSAT scores generally received by black and Chicano students . . .put them in the
position of having to earn higher college grades than their white counterparts for an equal
chance of admission," NADER REPORT at 225, and the NCBL Report adopts the same per-
spective, see NCBL Report at 34-38. How this statement supports the assertion that the
LSAT is more discriminatory than undergraduate grades is a mystery. After all, one could
also say that the lower grades generally obtained by minority applicants, see note 72 supra,
force them to earn higher LSAT scores than white students.
The NCBL Report also maintains that admitting minority students "on the basis of
UGPA alone is considerably more favorable" than admitting "under a race-blind system
using LSAT and UGPA." Id. at 37. The statistical support provided for this conclusion,
however, is sheer sophistry. The report compares the hypothetical rates at which minorities
would have been accepted in 1976 had admissions been based on a linear combination of
LSAT and UGPA to the actual rate at which minority students with various UGPAs were
accepted. Inasmuch as affirmative action programs were in place to aid minority students
with low UGPAs in 1976, this comparison proves very little. The better comparison is be-
tween race-blind admissions based on LSAT alone, UGPA alone, and UGPA and LSAT
combined. The information presented in Evans, supra note 32, at 604, on the distributions
among ethnic groups of LSAT scores and the UGPAs in the class entering law schools in
1976 is not sufficiently detailed to allow this comparison. Nevertheless, by performing
some linear interpolations to subdivide the categories used in that report, it appears that if
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it is plain that ignoring LSAT scores would not help many law
schools discern which applicants-of whatever race or ethnic back-
ground-are academically qualified. It seems preferable to use the
LSAT and related data to make the best possible judgment as to
academic risk, and to select an appropriate mix of students with
the available places had been allocated by LSAT alone, 13 percent of the black candidates,
23 percent of the Hispanic applicants, and 61 percent of the white candidates would have
been accepted. Almost the same pattern would have resulted if acceptances had been dis-
tributed by LSAT combined with UGPA. The hypothetical acceptance rates are then 11
percent, 23 percent, and 61 percent, respectively. Under an admissions process that consid-
ers UGPA alone, there would be a distinct improvement for minorities. This system would
produce distinct acceptance rates of 30 percent, 41 percent, and 59 percent, respectively.
These calculations tend to substantiate the view that selection by UGPA has a less severe
adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics than does selection by LSAT.
The true picture, however, may not be adequately depicted by these simple calculations.
The derivation of these figures by linear interpolations is inexact, because the actual distri-
butions are obviously nonlinear. In addition, admission rates based on a system that looked
to undergraduate grades alone would be complicated by consideration of the colleges at-
tended and the fields of study pursued by minority and majority candidates. Finally, even
if the UGPA figures are uncritically accepted, they still represent admission rates for blacks
and Hispanics that are below the status quo. Despite the heavy weighting of the LSAT that
the Nader, NCBL, and MALDEF reports decry, 39 percent of the black applicants, 47 per-
cent of the Hispanic candidates, and 59 percent of the white applicants were admitted to
law schools in 1976. Id. at 604.
The MALDEF Report relies on its own study of three San Francisco Bay Area law schools
to show that UGPA has a less disparate impact. It finds that the mean rankings of minority
groups are higher when the relative weight given to the LSAT is decreased. MALDEF RE-
PORT at 60. The report does not state in absolute terms how much improvement in the
rankings is obtained. Neither does it state what effect the shift in rankings would have had
on actual offers of admissions. Indeed, the MALDEF study looked only to shifts among
students already accepted to law school, making it impossible for the researchers to gauge di-
rectly the effects on minority applicants.
Because it is offers of admission, not rankings of students who are admitted, that is of
importance to persons who want to enter law school, I used the data on the most recent
group of applicants to the Arizona State University College of Law to gain some insight
into this question. The results were consistent with the MALDEF Report's findings. Selection
based solely on the LSAT would have admitted only one minority student, a Native Ameri-
can. Rankings on the basis of the expression LSAT + 120 x UGPA (the optimal linear
combination of LSAT and UGPA in the least squared sense for Arizona State) would have
admitted two Native Americans and three Hispanics. Using UGPA alone would have ad-
mitted one Native American, six Hispanics, and three blacks.
This limited demonstration of the relatively unfavorable impact of the LSAT is subject to
many of the same caveats as is the previous analysis of the national-applicant data. For ex-
ample, if attention were paid to such factors as the field of study and the college attended,
the gains associated with undergraduate grades might disappear. But see NCBL Report at
38-43 (arguing that proper consideration of such factors would not disadvantage minori-
ties). In addition, compared to the existing admissions process at Arizona State, which uses
the weighted combination of LSAT and UGPA along with other factors, admission by
UGPA alone would have proved disastrous for minority admissions. Under the existing
program, 28 Hispanics, 10 blacks, and 10 Native Americans were admitted. To be sure, the
critics of the LSAT might not wish to see race-blind adherence to UGPA, but it is not obvi-
ous that admissions by undergraduate grades and other factors would produce any more




due regard to other considerations, including minority status. 10 1
Fairness in selection and accuracy in prediction are complementary
virtues, not implacable antagonists.
101. The MALDEF Report offers some suggestions as to how this might be done.
MALDEF REPORT at 39-58. It also remarks on the important role of supportive programs.
Id. at 63-78.
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Robert Burt's Taking Care of Strangers1 is both fascinating to read
and frustrating to review. Drawing heavily on psychoanalytic
theory, the book proposes a legal mechanism for designing an in-
formed consent doctrine of doctor-patient relations that is far
more fluid, dynamic, and interactional than the current law.
The book makes fascinating reading (my first reading of it made
almost enjoyable a six hour delay at National Airport) because, in
attempting to construct a new notion of informed consent, Profes-
sor Burt makes an enormous number of creative, insightful, and
thought-provoking comments on an extremely varied range of
topics, including the impact of the abolition of civil commitment
laws, 2 the incest taboo, 3 the problem of child abuse, 4 the phenome-
non of irrational and infantile thinking in adults, 5 the experiments
of Stanley Milgram on the propensity to obey malevolent scientific
authority, 6 the placebo effect,7 and the development of the in-
formed consent doctrine .
The book makes frustrating reviewing because nowhere does
Burt set forth a step-by-step guide to what he is proposing, why he
is proposing it, or how his proposal might actually be implemented.
t Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
1. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELA-
TIONS (1979) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. See pp. 32-34, 44.
3. See pp. 56-60.
4. See pp. 61-65.
5. See pp. 50-54.
6. See pp. 72-91 (discussing S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974)).
7. See pp. 104-06.
8. See pp. 102-03.
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Due to this shortcoming, the major difficulty I have with the work,
the book is particularly prone to idiosyncratic interpretation, or to
outright misinterpretation, by readers. How difficult the book is to
interpret becomes especially evident when the reader turns re-
viewer and attempts to summarize the book, and to piece portions of
it together, in order to launch a review. My interpretation follows.
All adults, Burt tells us, whether they be doctors, patients, com-
mitment officials, or ordinary individuals, retain alongside their ra-
tional "secondary process" thinking an irrational "primary process"
thinking characteristic of infants.9 Infantile thinking is full of para-
doxical and unclear distinctions: distinctions between the bounda-
ries of self and others, between feelings of impotence and omnipo-
tence, and between feeling pain and experiencing the pleasure that
nurturing parents insure will quickly follow the pain."°
Primary process thinking in adults is particularly noticeable in
abusive parents. Such parents, Burt claims, have difficulty distin-
guishing their own pain from their child's pain. They may inflict
pain on the child in order to reexperience the pleasure of feeling
pain. At the same time, the child's pain reminds those parents of
their own painful childhood, and the child's ability to trigger such
unpleasant memories makes the child seem to have enormous
power over them. Those parents may abuse the child in order to
silence him and obliterate that memory. Abusive conduct also re-
stores the parents' feeling that they are omnipotent in their rela-
tion to the child. Abusing parents are distinguishable from nur-
turing ones particularly in their inability to tolerate their incapacity
to separate their own pain from their child's."
Although primary process thinking is especially evident in abu-
sive parents, it may surface in any adult, including doctors and
commitment officials, especially when those officials deal with indi-
viduals who appear bizarre, alien, and constantly pained.' 2 Burt
provides examples of such abuse-prone persons: Mr. G, a blinded,
severely burned victim who resisted treatment, 13 and Mrs. Lake, a
disoriented, "wandering" woman who was committed to a mental
institution in the District of Columbia.' 4 Benevolent and abusive
motives fuse when we "care for" such persons, for "the pessimism
9. Pp. 51-54.
10. P. 50.
11. See pp. 61-65.
12. See p. 65.
13. Pp. 1-21; see note 36 infra.
14. Pp. 22-45; see Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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that peculiarly afflicts the abusing parents in their perceptions of
their children, and that triggers their abusive conduct, is everyone's
common perception of Mr. G and Mrs. Lake."1 5
Burt believes that in typical, healthy interpersonal relations, no
person conceives of himself, vis-a-vis another person, as wholly
choice-making or wholly choiceless.' 6 Instead, "each party typically
conceives himself alternatingly through one mode and the
other.1 7 A patient like Mr. G or Mrs. Lake, however, provokes us
to adopt an unhealthy, rigid distinction between ourself and that
person, between being wholly choiceless and being wholly choice-
making.' 8 Invoking the vagaries of psychoanalytic theory, Burt ex-
plains the danger of such a distinction:
Whenever anyone seeks to conceive himself as either a wholly
choice-making or wholly choiceless individual regarding an-
other person, that aspiration reflects the individual's uncer-
tainty regarding the boundaries between his "self" and the
other's and an unwillingness consciously to acknowledge his
uncertainty. This unwillingness finds expression in an intra-
psychic attempt to conceive both people as one, thereby at-
tempting the tour deforce of suppressing the belief that the two
people should be conceived as separate entities. Unless the at-
tempt to maintain this univalent conception is interrupted, the
individual is led toward action to destroy the physical existence
of that other person and/or himself in order to keep his
intrapsychic grasp on the constructed "self" which depends on
the obliteration of the "other's" alien separateness.t9
In Burt's view, the law should help us avoid the destructive con-
sequences that flow from our temptation to view abuse-prone peo-
ple like Mr. G or Mrs. Lake as either wholly choice-making (Mr. G
wants to die, so the doctors have no say; Mrs. Lake is free to lead
her life as she wishes, so there is nothing the commitment officials
can do to prevent her from wandering) or as wholly choiceless (Mr.
G's desire to die is irrational, so we will treat him despite his ex-
pressed wishes; Mrs. Lake is senile and confused, so she needs
long-term institutionalization). Rather, the law should structure
15. P. 65. Some have even speculated that certain types of children may produce abu-
sive behavior in parents, rather than vice versa. Skolnick, The Myth of the Vulnerable Child,
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medical and psychiatric decisionmaking to serve as quasi-psycho-
analytic sessions, fostering oscillation in self-conceptions and pre-
venting patients and other participants from fixing on univalent
conceptions.2 0
To achieve this healthy oscillation, the law should encourage on-
going communication and negotiation between doctor and pa-
tient.2 ' Burt proposes that the law encourage increased communi-
cation by refusing to settle doctor-patient debates conclusively at
the pre-treatment stage.22 Instead, doctor and patient should con-
front each other and seek to come to treatment terms knowing that
the law may review the scenario after the fact.23 The possibility of
post-treatment review and an uncertainty about civil and criminal
liability should, Burt believes, provide a framework for a conversa-
tion that will make less likely the adoption of destructive univalent
conceptions. 24
To limit the law's role to predominantly after-the-fact review,
Burt proposes that civil commitment laws be reformed to allow for
only short-term commitments, during which doctors might be lim-
ited to those treatment modalities "clearly intended and necessarily
limited to fostering conversation" 25 between doctor and patient. In
the case of Mrs. Lake, then, officials could confine her only for a
short stay, at the expiration of which she would have to be released
-unless [the doctors] could persuade her to remain or unless they
were willing to run risks of [civil or criminal] liability for retaining
her longer."26
In Mr. G's case, the doctors could either respect Mr. G's wishes
not to be given skin grafts and painful chemical immersions, or
they could confine and treat him over his objections, hoping that
no civil or criminal action would result.2 7 A pre-treatment resolu-
tion of the rights and liabilities of the doctors and Mr. G would be
unavailable unless the doctors were able to establish Mr. G's resis-
tance to treatment as irrational, as temporary mental incompe-
tence .2 Even in the rather unlikely event that the doctors would
20. P. 119.
21. See pp. 120-21.
22. P. 121.
23. Pp. 126-27, 137.
24. See p. 137.
25. P. 129. Burt does not indicate whether his proposal would apply to guardianship
laws, but presumably it would.
26. P. 141.
27. Pp. 131-33.
28. Mr. G was severely burned as he turned his automobile ignition switch. His father
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seek or obtain a civil commitment or guardianship order in Mr. G's
case, any order they obtained would, under Burt's scheme, be lim-
ited in time and in the treatment it permitted, and would be de-
signed to foster conversation.29 The possibility of post-treatment
review would constitute the major legal force shaping the doctors'
actions regarding Mr. G.
For dealing with individuals like Mr. G and Mrs. Lake, then,
Burt proposes severely curtailing both the length of time for which
such individuals may be committed and the types of treatment au-
thorized during commitment. Burt also applies his theories to "si-
lent" patients: patients who are comatose, as in the celebrated case
of Karen Quinlan, 30 or severely mentally retarded, as in the case of
Joseph Saikewicz, a Massachusetts man suffering from leukemia
whose life could have been prolonged by chemotherapy treat-
ments.3' In those kinds of cases, Burt would make unavailable de-
claratory judgments on the propriety of administering or with-
holding treatment. Burt believes that, facing the possibility of later
civil or criminal liability, the doctors and family members would
converse and agonize until a consensus emerges from a thorough
airing of the matter.3 2
Burt's thesis raises two principal questions: Will the proposal in
fact increase communication, and will increased communication ac-
tually improve decisionmaking?
died in the accident. There is some psychiatric evidence that Mr. G's guilt over the incident
caused him to believe he did not "deserve" to live. P. 10. Additionally, there is some evi-
dence that Mr. G wanted to die principally because he believed others, including family
members, wanted him to die. P. 11.
29. P. 129. Particularly because Mr. G reported the chemical immersions as "very pain-
ful," p. 180, I am unable to understand how Burt applies his own commitment and treat-
ment proposals to the facts of Mr. G's case:
Mr. G's situation can illustrate my vision for reformation of the law. If the civil com-
mitment law provided that a finding of mental illness justified overriding Mr. C's pro-
tests only for a limited time period (say, thirty days) and only with treatment modalities
that were clearly intended and necessarily limited to fostering conversation between him and
his physicians, that would mean Mr. G could be forced to continue the chemical im-
mersions for thirty days and to meet with the psychiatrist and other physicians, but
that no law would force him to acquiesce in the operation on his hands. The immersions
would not be authorized because they were necessary to keep him alive and thus available for con-
versation, but rather because the immersions themselves were not central to and did not end the
dispute between him and his physicians. A time-limited continuation of the immersions
could be seen by both parties as temporizing and thus as an inducement toward,
rather than the end of, conversation.
P. 129 (emphasis added).
30. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
31. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
32. Pp. 165-67. Burt's emphasis on agonizing is explicit. Pp. 127, 165, 167.
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II
Burt recognizes that "[i]t may be that no physician today would
knowingly risk even a dollar fine or damages payment for holding
Mr. G against his expressed will."'33 He also recognizes that unless
and until physicians "come to believe that only a limited or bear-
able adversity might result if they disregarded Mr. G's claim for re-
lease, 34 his proposal would not lead to increased communication,
but would lead instead to the prompt termination of communica-
tion and treatment.3 5 If that is the result, persons such as Mr. G
would, curiously, receive less treatment under Burt's model than





36. Though it is not an explicit component of Burt's thesis, a value preference for
treatment over non-treatment clearly runs through his book. See, e.g., pp. 165, 167
(emphasizing "prolonging treatment").
To begin to gain insight into the empirical question whether a person like Mr. G would
be more likely to be treated over his objections under Burt's scheme or under a scheme
authorizing pre-treatment adjudication, I administered a "Mr. G hypothetical" to fifty-
three summer-session law students. Without being told that there were two versions of the
problem, half of the students (Group A) were given a form asking them to decide the case
in a pre-treatment context, and half (Group B) were given a form posing the matter in a
post-treatment civil suit. The facts were stated as follows:
Mr. G is a twenty-seven year old unmarried man who has always been very active in
sports. After service in the air force, he joined his father's real estate firm. Soon there-
after, the two men went together to inspect some property. When their car failed to
start, Mr. G's father lifted the hood to manipulate the carburetor and directed his
son to start the ignition. Mr. G did so, and the car suddenly was enveloped by fire. Un-
knowingly, they had parked the car over a leaking gas main.
Mr. G's father died on the way to the hospital. Mr. G had received severe burns
over two-thirds of his body. He was not expected 'to survive, but he did, though
blinded and terribly maimed. From the beginning of his hospitalization he suffered
greatly. Doctors believed there was constant danger that fatal infections would enter
his extensive open sores. Each day, to guard against this, he was immersed in a
chemical-filled tank for excruciatingly painful treatments. Surgeons also performed
several operations for skin grafts, for unsuccessful efforts to save his sight, and for
restoring some movement to his limbs. Throughout this time, Mr. G had repeatedly
expressed doubts about whether he wanted to live. Nine months after his accident, he
adamantly refused further medical treatment. In an interview with Dr. White, a psy-
chiatrist, Mr. G explained his refusal.
Mr. G: What really, I guess, astounds me, I guess I'd say, is that in a country like
this where freedom has been stressed so much and civil liberties, especially during
the last few years, how a person can be made to stay under a doctor's care and be
subjected to the painful treatment, such as the tankings which are very painful,
against this person's wishes, especially if he has demonstrated the ability to reason.
Dr. White: Even where discontinuing these tankings and the like would be a circum-
stance that would mean that infections would set in that would end your life.
Mr. G: Even then. The way I see it, who is a doctor to decide whether a person lives
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Deinstitutionalized mentally disabled persons, who are mounting
in numbers,37 run a serious risk of being denied important medical
attention if Burt's scheme backfires. That result seems likely with
such "silent" or "semi-silent" patients. When a mentally retarded
person resides in the community, the person has no clear "right" to
be treated by a given doctor, and the doctor has no legal "obliga-
tion" to treat such a person. If an arguably incompetent person re-
quires, or simply requests, a risky medical or surgical procedure,
or dies just because someone has put him under your care as a doctor? As long as
the patient is willing to be treated, I certainly think that a doctor should do every-
thing they should, they could.
Dr. White: But you feel that you properly should have the legal right to say, "No, I
do not want to be treated."
Mr. G: Yes, I don't see how anyone else could possibly have this right, justifiably
have this right. That's what, like I said, really astounds me.
[P. 180.1
In Dr. White's view, Mr. G was in a confused state. Guilty over his father's death,
which came about from Mr. G's turning the ignition switch, Mr. G was struggling psy-
chologically with the question whether he himself "deserved" to live. Further, in Dr.
White's view, Mr. G was choosing death because of a nagging feeling that others-such
as his next of kin---"really" wished he would die.
Group A: Sharing Dr. White's perspective, Dr. Brown, the physician overseeing Mr.
G's treatment, wished to treat Mr. G despite G's expressed wishes. Dr. Brown goes to
court seeking authorization to treat Mr. G.
Group B: Sharing Dr. White's perspective, Dr. Brown, the physician overseeing Mr.
G's treatment, wished to treat Mr. G despite G's expressed wishes. Under local law,
there is no procedure for seeking, in advance of treatment, a court ruling regarding
the propriety of proposed treatment. Dr. Brown treated Mr. G, and Mr. G then filed
suit against Dr. Brown.
Assume that you are the decisionmaker, that the governing law is unclear, and that
your decision should be based simply on your intuitive inclinations.
In each group (one of 26 members, the other of 27), only eight respondents (fewer than
one-third) ruled in favor of the doctor. Because of the limited sample size, I did not at-
tempt to ascertain how comfortable with their decisions the decisionmakers were, nor did I
ascertain the amount of damages they would have awarded in the post-treatment suit. I
did collect comments from several of the participants. One student who had answered a
post-treatment form remarked upon turning in her form: "I sure wish I could have de-
cided this case before treatment. Then I would surely have ruled for G. As it is, I ruled for
G anyway, but it was difficult to do so, and I surely wouldn't have given him much in the
way of damages." Another student, who ruled for the doctor in the post-treatment context,
commented that she would not have if the doctor had had the opportunity to seek pre-
treatment review and had failed to do so. But f. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Mass.
1980) (negligence should not be based solely on failure to seek prior court approval if such
approval would have been given).
Upon learning that two out of three courts would rule against the treating physician in
the Mr. G post-treatment hypothetical, it is likely that doctors would refrain from treating
similarly situated objecting patients. But under a legal system in which there seems to be a
one in three chance of obtaining a pre-treatment commitment or guardianship order, one-
third of the similarly situated patients may well be subjected to treatment.
37. Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, President's Comm'n on Mental Health,
Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 ARIZ.
L. REv. 49, 72 (1978).
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doctors, if they are unable to gain a pre-treatment determination
of competency, are likely to refuse the treatment. The fear of later
liability premised on the patient's inability to give competent
consent, particularly in those situations in which there are signifi-
cant inherent risks, such as paralysis in orthopedic surgery, will dis-
courage doctors from treating patients arguably incapable of
consenting. Doctors unable to obtain a pre-treatment adjudication
of patient competence or incompetence will be extraordinarily re-
luctant to perform irreversible procedures, such as sterilizations
and abortions, on mentally retarded persons. 38
Instead of increasing communication, Burt's proposal may thus,
in certain circumstances, simply terminate the conversation be-
tween doctor and patient. Even if the quantity of "talking" by doc-
tors increases, however, it is not clear that genuine two-way "com-
munication" will be advanced. In Mrs. Lakes' case, suppose that the
doctors, using skills of persuasion and perhaps "drugs... to calm
her in conjunction with attempts to talk to her,"39 "talked her into"
remaining in the hospital and submitting to tranquilizing medica-
tion. If a major concern of the doctors is whether Mrs. Lake
"would later sue them, 40 the doctors would be able and likely to
confine her with impunity so long as they keep her sedate, appreci-
ative, and non-litigious.
My reading of Taking Care of Strangers suggests that this
troubling scenario is quite possible should Burt's proposal be im-
plemented. Yet, it is difficult to believe that Burt would support
such a result, especially in light of his concern that, under existing
law, a person like Mrs. Lake might "be led explicitly to consent to
38. See Ruby v. Massey. 452 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Conn. 1978) (in absence of proce-
dure for ascertaining legal effectiveness of patient consent, doctors and hospitals refused to
perform sterilizations on mentally retarded persons); Petro v. McCullough, 385 N.E.2d
1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (suit against doctor, by mildly retarded and previously hospital-
ized patient, claiming tubal ligation was performed with consent patient was incompetent
to give).
If Burt's proposal has the effect of making pre-treatment adjudication unavailable in
such instances, and if the inability of physicians to obtain pre-treatment guidance virtually
forecloses the possibility of mentally retarded persons securing constitutionally protected
sterilizations and abortions, Burt's scheme may be deemed unconstitutional. In Ruby, the
statutory silence and ambiguity regarding legal procedures for sterilizing noninstitu-
tionalized retarded persons led doctors and hospitals to refuse to perform such procedures
on mentally retarded persons residing in the community. 452 F. Supp. at 364 & n.13.
Plaintiffs challenged the de facto denial of the right to sterilization on grounds of privacy,
due process, and equal protection. Id. at 363. The court considered only the equal protec-
tion claim and found it meritorious. Id at 369.
39. P. 141.
40. Id.
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lifetime hospitalization on the back ward of a mental hospital,"41
his psychodynamic analysis concluding that even the abolition of
civil commitment laws would probably not alter that destructive dy-
namic,42 and his penetrating critique of the ethics of Stanley
Milgram's experiments on obedience to malevolent scientific au-
thority. 43 In the Milgram experiments, subjects complied with a
scientist's directives and administered to a third person what the
subjects thought were painful electric shocks. Burt provides a con-
vincing argument that subjects who were led by the mantle of sci-
ence to succumb to these so-called malevolent wishes of an
experimenter could be led, by the very same process, to tell the ex-
perimenters that they were not emotionally pained by having par-
ticipated in the indisputably stressful experiment.44 Why would not
any acquiescence to hospitalization by a Mrs. Lake also constitute
mere "compliance with the [scientific doctor's] obvious wishes"?4 5
The same analysis applies to the case of Mr. G. He ultimately
consented to medical treatment and now, despite a stormy period
immediately after he first left the hospital, is apparently doing
well. 46 Why should we conclude, as Burt does, that "each day that
[Mr. G] lives can be more conviicingly characterized as his choice
for himself. . .?47 Why should we not conclude that Mr. G's ulti-
mate acquiescence in the treatment, his failure to sue the doctors,
his belated appreciativeness, and his decision not to take his life are
41. P. 38. See also p. 41. For Burt's critique of the "consensual format," see p. 39.
42. See pp. 32-34, 41-45. Burt believes that since "[tlhe stress created in others by Mrs.
Lake's confused appearance was not an artifact of the civil commitment laws," p. 33, but
was attributable instead to Mrs. Lake's confusion about the conceptual boundaries between
herself and others, the abolition of civil commitment laws would not significantly alter the
destructive forces that Mrs. Lake unleases in others. Instead, she is likely to be pressured
into consenting to "voluntary" hospitalization, p. 41, "pressed by implicit and explicit so-
cial pressures to ask for her self-obliteration," p. 34.
As noted in the text, however, I fail to see how abolition differs from doctor-patient rela-
tions guided only by possible after-the-fact judicial review. The abolition of civil commit-
ment laws would not, of course, undo existing after-the-fact civil and criminal penalties for
wrongful or coerced confinement. Thus, if civil commitment laws were abolished eitter doc-
tors would refrain from abusing Mrs. Lake for fear that they may later be sued or prose-
cuted for wrongful imprisonment, in which case Burt is wrong in his assessment of the im-
pact of abolition, or doctors would abuse Mrs. Lake, in which case Burt is wrong in his
assessment of the salutary effects of after-the-fact review!
43. See pp. 86-89.
44. "Their assurances that they felt no pain were, it seems to me, as much compliance
with the experimenter's obvious wishes as their earlier compliance with the directive [to ad-
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all nothing more than a patient-subject's compliance with the
wishes of his medically clothed experimenter?
III
We have seen, then, that Burt's legal system, rather than
increasing the quantity and quality of communication, may cut off
conversation or induce one-sided, coercive conversation. Even if an
increase in full-fledged communication were to be a result of Burt's
proposal, however, there is some question whether the increased
communication would actually improve the decisionmaking pro-
cess. Not surprisingly, we feel more confident in our decisions
when they are reached after spending significant amounts of en-
ergy and effort poring over details. Ordinarily, of course, there is a
positive payoff to that course of action: decisions are generally
likely to be "better" if they are made after careful consideration, ef-
fort, and even agony.
Sometimes, however, particularly when we deal with important
matters having no easy answers, we delude ourselves into believ-
ing that the process of agonizing will somehow improve our deci-
sions. But agonizing can in some situations be costly and even
counterproductive. Lengthy medical school admission interviews
have been criticized because they lack predictive power and may
even lower the quality of the admission decision. 4 One important
study on the related topic of predicting success in college revealed
that "[a]ll six of the [predicting] psychologists were able to make
better predictions with [four] predictors than they were with
[twenty-two] predictors. ' 49 Another study, dealing with the pro-
cessing of mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSOs), found that
although participating judges and psychiatrists may well believe that
their effort and expertise is important in determining the outcome
of cases, whether or not a person is found to be an MDSO depends
on the defendant's prior sex-related criminal record, a variable that
precedes judicial and psychiatric consideration of the particular
case."
0
48. La Brecque, On Making Sounder Judgments, PSYCH. TODAY, June 1980, at 33, 42.
49. Bartlett & Green, Clinical Prediction: Does One Sometimes Know Too Much? 13 J.
COUNSELING PSYCH. 267, 268 (1966). Sometimes, however, by "diluting" what would have
otherwise been too extreme a prediction, the exposure of clinicians to technically irrele-
vant factors serves to improve prediction. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATE-
GIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 154-56 (1980).
50. Konecni, Mulcahy, & Ebbesen, Prison or Mental Hospital: Factors Affecting the Pro-
cessing of Ptrsons Suspected of Being "Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders," in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH 87, 112-15 (P. Lipsitt & B. Sales eds. 1980). The authors have also
The Yale Law Journal
In some instances, communicating and deliberating more can be
simply wasteful. Costly decisionmaking strategies are, of course,
least appropriate for "decisions that, although of critical impor-
tance, have outcomes that are unknowable in principle or that are
presently indistinguishable in terms of their overall costs and bene-
fits."51
Burt can be read to suggest that the issues that concern him are
often virtually unknowable.52 Is Mr. G's wish to die really his own
wish, or is it his attempt to implement what he perceives to be the
wishes of others? If it is "really" his own wish, is it based on the re-
ality of his present condition and his potential for future improve-
ment, or is it based on the fact that he feels guilty for surviving the
holocaust that killed his father? If the latter is the case, should that
fact affect our decision on whether to respect his wish to die? Is
Mr. G making a decision during a momentary state of balance be-
tween the alternative concepts of himself as a choice-maker or a
choice-taker, or is he making the decision while holding to an ide-
ology of self that lies on either end of the spectrum? When Karen
Quinlan's father seeks to ascertain whether Karen would want to
die, can he escape a psychological renvoi, insightfully illuminated by
Burt,53 asking himself whether Karen would want to know how he
felt?
It may be that when we are called upon to make important deci-
sions but are unsure of what substantive standard to employ, or are
unsure of what evidence must exist to ascertain whether an agreed-
upon substantive standard has been met, our tendency is to com-
pensate by resorting to increased "process. '54 In those situations,
however, such "process" is inefficient.
shown that criminal sentencing decisions are directly related to a defendant's prior bail sta-
tus 6jail, bail, or release on recognizance), that bail status is directly related to the
prosecuting attorney's recommendation, and that the recommendation is directly related to
the severity of the crime. Id. at 89; see Ebbesen & Konecni, Decision Making and Information
Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 805, 819-20
(1975). See also Shaprio & Clement, Presentence of Information in Felony Cases in the Masachusetts
Superior Court, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 49, 58-59 (1975) (judges wanted more information in
presentence reports and thought information would improve accuracy, but additional in-
formation is as likely to confuse as to help).
51. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 49, at 279.
52. See pp. 15, 20, 37, 92, 121, 146.
53. P. 152.
54. It seems that "when the appropriate schema for analysis of a given situation is
weak, then obvious and powerful theories used habitually in other domains will likely in-
trude." R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 49, at 136-37. Thus, people sometimes attempt to
use "skills," such as thought, choice, effort, and involvement, in situations in which the out-
come depends on "chance," and cannot be affected by the use of skills. Langer, The Illuszon
of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYcH. 311, 322-23 (1975).
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Should we subject patients, doctors, and families to what may be
unnecessary agony? Karen Quinlan's devout parents were aided by
a priest in reaching their decision to request termination of her
life-support system.55 Suppose such unequivocal support had not
been forthcoming. Should the life-support system have been con-
tinued if Mr. Quinlan had failed to concur explicitly in a decision
to terminate it?36 If Mr. Quinlan had, under those circumstances,
agreed reluctantly, might he not have later suffered psychologically
for having agreed to a course of action not unequivocally endorsed
by his church? Should the law force someone in that position to
make such a choice?5 7 Should not the role of the law be to reduce
agony rather than to create it?58
Perhaps, however, increased agony generally produces psycho-
logical payoffs. The literature suggests that even if the answers to
certain important questions are more or less unknowable, persons
having a role in making important decisions may ultimately feel
better and more confident about any decision made with their full
involvement and after the airing of all factors that at least seem rel-
evant to the matter's resolution.5 9 Indeed, perhaps not only the
55. P. 162.
56. See p. 167 ("[tlreatment should be prolonged unless the face-to-face participants were
unanimously agreed otherwise .... ")
57. If, contrary to Burt's scheme, declaratory judgments were available, an individual
would not be put in the position of either repressing his religious views or of expressing
them knowing that they will then control the outcome. Declaratory relief makes possible an
alternative in which the individual maintains his loyalty to his religious beliefs, and yet does
not allow those beliefs to prevent him from receiving needed medical treatment. See In re
President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., in cham-
bers), rehearing en bane denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964)
(Jehovah's Witness refused to consent to blood transfusion on religious grounds, but
wanted to live and communicated to court that, if court ordered the transfusion, her reli-
gion would not be violated because decision would not be her responsibility).
58. See Wexler, Criminal Commitment Contingency Structures, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW
AND PSYCHOLoGY: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 121, 128-33 (B. Sales ed. 1977) (propos-
ing legal scheme for reducing unnecessary agony in decision to release institutionalized
mental patients); Wexler, Vietimology and Mental Health Law: An Agenda, 66 VA. L. REV. 681,
699-700 (1980) (proposing legal scheme allowing for face-saving by fathers in family ther-
apy).
59. Decisionmakers seem to want large amounts of information, and feel more confi-
dent about decisions "based" on such information, even if the information seems technically
not to have influenced the decision or if the information reduced the accuracy of the deci-
sion. See p. 467 & notes 48-50 supra (citing sources). Much evidence exists suggesting that
we feel better about decisions over which we exercise control and even about decisions over
which ivefalsely believe we exercise control. See Langer, supra note 54, at 323. See generally
Langer & Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibility for the Aged: A Field
Expt rin nt in an Institutional Setting, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 191 (1976) (giving
nursing home residents increased responsibility improved their condition). See also M.
SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS (1975) (depression linked to belief that one cannot control impor-
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participating decisionmakers, but society as a whole, including Burt
and his readers, feels better about decisions that are agonized over.
In-depth conversation may be psychologically important, then,
even if the answer to the ultimate issues, or the ultimate issues
themselves, are unknowable. Full consideration of the issues should
be even more important to the extent that some of the crucial ques-
tions involved are either answerable or knowable. Surely some are:
Has Mr. G been informed that psychiatrists believe he may wish to
end his life not because of a "rational" desire to terminate pain but
because of an "irrational" guilt over his father's death? If he is so
informed, would that information influence his decision? Does
Mrs. Lake's inability to recall her address mean that she cannot
find her way home or does it mean only that she has difficulty re-
membering digits? 0 Could Karen Quinlan breathe without the res-
pirator? Could that question be answered by removing her from
the respirator for a few minutes?61 Is Mr. Saikewicz so severely re-
tarded that his acquiescence in chemotherapy could not have been
obtained? Could his cooperation be obtained through heavy seda-
tion and intensive staff efforts to calm him? 62
Burt raises many of those important questions and is right to be
concerned that they were not asked or answered before or during
the pre-treatment adjudications in Lake, Quinlan, and Saikewicz. It is
his thesis that the stress and destructive consequences unleashed by
distressed patients and fueled by pre-treatment legal intervention
makes it likely that these important matters will go unexplored in
commitment hearings and actions for declaratory relief. He pre-
sumably believes that those same issues would be addressed in a le-
gal system that generates communication by emphasizing uncer-
tainty and the possibility of post-treatment legal redress.
Yet, the context in which conversation would occur under Burt's
model possesses many, though not all, of the attributes that stu-
dents of group dynamics suggest will produce "groupthink"63 or
tarn elements of one's life); Geer, Davison, & Gatchel, Reduction of Stress in Humans Through
Nonveridical Perceived Control of Aversive Stimulation, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 731
(1970) (illusion of control over experimental shocks make shocks less stress-inducing).
60. See p. 26.
61. In fact, before the court hearing, she had been so removed uneventfully, but that
fact was never forcefully argued. P. 154.
62. P. 157.
63. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CON-
FLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 129-33, 395-400 (1977); Janis, What Group Dynamics Can
Contribute to the Study of Policy Decisions, in POLICY STUDIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 125 (S.
Nagel ed. 1975); Siegel & Zajonc, Group Risk Taking in Professional Decisions, 30 SOCIOMETRY
339 (1967).
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other types of faulty group decisionmaking.64 Groupthink is a
concurrence-seeking tendency that impairs careful decisionmaking
in cohesive groups.6 5 Even in ad hoc groups with great internal
conflict, members generally try to "smooth conflicts over rather
than resolve them, 6 a practice that often leads to "wildly inaccu-
rate solutions. 67
Group decisionmaking, which in most circumstances is superior
to individual decisionmaking, 68 plummets in quality in the faceof
authoritarian leadership, crisis situations, stress, moral dilemmas,
member dependence on group approval for maintaining a self-
image of decency, and relative insulation of group members until
after a final decision." ' Consider those characteristics in relation to
Burt's conversational model for a Quinlan-type situation: Doctors
clothed in the authoritative and authoritarian mantle of medicine
meet with family members at a time of crisis and stress to ponder
the moral dilemma of continuing life-support systems, with each
member seeking group concurrence in and support for a decision
the decency of which will later be judged.
Students of group dynamics, and of decisionmaking generally,
have devised methods to minimize many of the obstacles that
impede accuracy in reaching decisions.70 They have suggested, for
example, that each member should be a "critical evaluator, '7 1 and
should encourage the group "to give high priority to airing objec-
tions and doubts. '7 2 Outside experts should be called in and
"should be encouraged to challenge the views of the core mem-
bers. 7 3 One or more members should be given the role of "devil's
advocate," with an "unambiguous assignment to present his argu-
ments as clearly and convincingly as he can, like a good lawyer,
challenging the testimony of those advocating the majority posi-
tion. '74 Finally, after reaching a "preliminary consensus," the
group should hold a "second chance" meeting at which "every
member is expected to express as vividly as he can all his residual
64. Set Hall, Decisions, Decisions, Decisions, PSYCH. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 51, 52-53.
65. See note 63 supra (citing sources).
66. Hall, supra note 64, at 52.
67. Id. at 53.
68. R. NISBEIT & L. Ross, supra note 49, at 267.
69. Janis, supra note 63, at 128-29.
70. R. NISBE-r & L. Ross, supra note 49, at 282-85; Hall, supra note 64, at 54, 86;
Janis, supra note 63, at 130-31.
71. Janis, supra note 63, at 130.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 131.
74. Id.
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doubts and to rethink the entire issue before making a definitive
choice." 75
If that advice is correct, which is not yet certain,7 6 curtailing im-
proper group decisionmaking procedures might be difficult under
the relatively unstructured framework likely to emerge from Burt's
after-the-fact legal framework. However stressful and destructive
its context, a pre-treatment adjudicatory framework, with a judge
focusing discussion and monitoring conflict, may be far more suit-
able for accommodating the above-suggested legally familiar de-
vices for minimizing error in multi-party decisionmaking.
These seem to me to constitute some of the major conceptual
and empirical issues that must be confronted in structuring a role
for the law in medical and psychiatric decisionmaking. Taking Care
of Strangers, a provocative book full of creative scholarship, will
make a major contribution to this important field by forcing a
reexamination of the role of law in it.7 7 If these matters are at all
knowable, the intellectual excitement and agony spawned by Burt's
work should improve our decisions regarding appropriate legal
structures for doctor-patient relationships.
75. Id.
76. The proposed remedies have yet to be empirically validated. I. JANIS & L. MANN, su-
pra note 63, at 400. Somewhat similar procedures have, however, withstood experimental
scrutiny. Hall, supra note 64, at 88.
77. As this review goes to press, some five months after grappling with the book, I
am struck by how much my own thinking has been influenced by Burt's central point re-
garding the stress and discomfort generated by patients in pain. Whether or not his solu-
tion is accepted, his exposition of the problem may itself constitute a major and lasting
contribution to legal scholarship in this field.
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